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The evolution in computing has made it possible to run programs at consis-
tently increasing speeds. We are now at a point where contemporary supercomputers
can execute programs at a rate higher than 10 petaFLOPS. This execution speed
is achieved by carefully optimizing underlying infrastructure such as the operating
system, executable le format, and even the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA);
resulting in tightly packed code that is free from redundancies.
Consequently, executables tend to be very strict about their layout and execu-
tion environment. Linkers position every piece of code at a specic location inside
a module. Their osets are xed throughout the lifetime of the executable. After
a program is fully-compiled, it cannot be modied without extensive operations on
the binary, since code is only meaningful at its assigned location. During execution,
the loader places each associated module into its assigned memory location. Once
a module is loaded, its address is xed throughout the execution. Even parts of
relocatable code that do not have absolute locations before execution are mapped
to xed locations at launch-time and cannot be moved afterwards. While some
execution environments such as the Java Virtual Machine provide some level of ex-
ibility in this process such as generating machine code just-in-time, others are very
restrictive about this compile-link-load-execute cycle.
Quite often, a program needs to be modied and patched even after the com-
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pilation phase is long over. Such cases sometimes arise due to the need to maintain
legacy programs whose source code is not available any more. Other times, binary
code has to be modied at runtime to apply security patches, or to instrument exe-
cution at various points such as function entry and exit points. When a basic block
in a function is instrumented, it needs to be relocated. This process involves updat-
ing addresses inside that basic block, inserting a branch instruction at the original
location, and adding adding a branch instruction to the end of that basic block. As
a result, instrumenting a basic block is error-prone and damages the performance.
Runtime instrumentation is not the rst nor the only tedious task that involves
strict program layout. Before we can do anything with the binary in hand, we need
to analyze the code and identify various parts such as functions and basic blocks
inside these functions. These structures are recognized after a thorough analysis of
the binary, examining it instruction-by-instruction, a process called binary parsing.
Any operation with binaries turns out to be extremely costly due to this instruction-
by-instruction parsing operation.
Strict layout of code also has drawbacks in memory usage. If demand paging
is not available, programs have to be loaded into the memory at launch time along
with the shared libraries they use to enforce that all functions that may be used
during execution are available in the memory at runtime. Some of these functions
may never be called, yet they still occupy memory. In addition to the unnecessary
memory overhead, these functions also damage the instruction cache since they also
potentially use up precious instruction cache space.
The fact that code has to live at xed locations also exposes serious security
2
risks. Many remote attacks benet from injecting malicious code at critical locations
in the memory space of the target process. The location of critical code is easy to
guess when it has to live at a xed location. O-the-shelf and open-source software
are especially vulnerable: When the attacker can obtain an exact copy of the target
software, nding addresses of critical functions is much easier. Even shared libraries
tend to be loaded at the same address across multiple executions. After locating a
target function, a typical return-oriented attack can be carried out by exploiting a
buer-overow to make a vulnerable program execute this target function.
We believe these restrictions, especially the fact that code has to reside at a pre-
determined location throughout its existence, are overly-conservative. To provide
more exibility to the users as well as developers, code should be usable wherever
it is loaded. That brings us to the thesis of this work:
Relocatable program components, generated by binary rewriting of
programs, results in executables with enhanced security and more e-
cient memory usage.
We make the following contributions in this dissertation:
We introduce a system that generates fully-relocatable functions:
Correct execution of several types of instructions in executables depends on
their locations: Branches require the target code to be present at its expected ad-
dress, table-based branches read their targets from a branch table that stores ad-
dresses of the target code, call instructions include a target address where the callee
should reside, etc. Even shared libraries that are compiled into position-independent
code (PIC), and hence are considered `relocatable', are only relocatable at the gran-
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ularity of whole libraries and any smaller chunk of code cannot be relocated by
itself. The reason is that any call instruction that targets a given function will not
work if that target function is moved to an arbitrary location. Therefore, position-
independent code alone is not enough for arbitrary function relocation. A function
can only be relocatable if it is decoupled from the location it occupies. In this work
we present a way to convert any executable to be fully relocatable at the function
granularity, along with a technique for self-relocation of functions at runtime without
requiring user input.
We provide an execution environment that is more resistant against
malicious attacks: Relocating the critical pieces of code provides resistance against
malicious attacks as attackers cannot easily determine the correct location of a func-
tion they want to execute. As part of my dissertation, we develop a system that con-
tinuously relocates functions at runtime so that attackers cannot identify functions
they want to execute forcibly. Our mechanism rst converts binaries to include fully
relocatable functions, then allows programs to relocate their functions at runtime.
A combination of relocation strategies provides a high level of randomization while
limiting the runtime overhead introduced by the relocation operations. Programs
that continuously relocate their functions benet from a more secure execution en-
vironment.
We decrease the memory footprint of shared libraries through pro-
ling and selective program loading: We created a system that prevents unused
functions from being loaded into the memory. Moreover, we grouped them so that
they also do not occupy space in the instruction cache. In the unlikely event of
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a call to one of these unused functions, our system dynamically loads the target
function and satises the call operation. As a result, the overall memory footprint
of application drops drastically without incurring any performance overhead.
We introduce relocatability at the basic block granularity for easier
instrumentation: Another concept we introduce in this work is relocatable basic
blocks. They are used to simplify binary instrumentation process. Relocatable
basic blocks can be moved without having to deal with other basic blocks around
them. Similarly, we do not need to insert a branch instruction in the old location
after the relocation, removing the need to use traps when relocated basic blocks are
small in size. As a result, tool builders can create simpler and more manageable
instrumentation tools.
We improve binary analysis speeds through faster binary parsing
with the help of a new compilation infrastructure: As part of this work, we
create a new mechanism to aid with the parsing of binaries. We store information
about the locations of basic blocks in a table inside the executable le with the
help of a compiler extension. During parsing, any binary analysis tool can read this
table and identify functions and basic blocks bypassing the need to decode every
instruction in the binary. This mechanism considerably reduces binary parsing time
and improves the instrumentation experience.
We show that the above goals can be met with no performance
drawback in some cases, and with tolerable slowdown in others: We con-
centrated our eorts to optimize the runtime performance of applications while pro-
viding these important functionalities. Our systems that deal with avoiding loading
5
unused functions and that generate tables to improve binary parsing do not intro-
duce any runtime overhead. Our runtime relocation operations and relocatable basic




In this chapter, we cover the related work in the area of binary analysis and
editing for security and optimization. We rst cover some compiler features for
executable le generation. Then we cover earlier work in the area of binary analysis
and binary editing tools. Binary parsing techniques and randomization strategies
for increased security are discussed next. Finally, we present previous work in the
area of reducing code size and the memory footprint of programs.
2.1 Compilation Techniques for Binary Analysis and Debugging
A compiler's most important task is to generate executable code. However,
compilers are also analysis tools that generate a wealth of information about the
program being created. Contemporary compilers store some of this information
inside binary les in the form of debug information. Such compilers include the GNU
Compiler Collection [34], Intel C++ Compiler [41], The Portland Group compilers
[78], LLVM's Clang [53], Oracle's Java compiler [66], and Microsoft Visual Studio
compilers [62]. Debug information consists of a map from line numbers in source
code to addresses in binary or intermediate languages, explanation of data types,
function signatures, locations and types of variables, etc., and is either stored in a
separate le (e.g. PDB) or is embedded into executable les (e.g. DWARF, Java
class les). Along with the debug information, compilers also emit a list of symbols
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to show locations of functions and global variables while generating native code.
There are other data structures, also generated by compilers, that are vital
to the correct execution of programs: Exception handling tables contain a map-
ping from instruction addresses to exception handling routines; unwind tables are
generated to assist with call chain and stack analysis, and are instrumental during
exception handling; and virtual function tables are used in object-oriented program-
ming languages.
None of the compilers we analyzed have support for generating runtime relo-
catable functions; or marking basic block boundaries and the relationship between
them to assist with the analysis of binaries. The compiler feature that is the most
relevant to the work presented in this dissertation is the just-in-time compilation of
code, a technique used by the Java Runtime Environment and the .NET Framework.
In this technique, program code is stored in a position-independent way in an inter-
mediate language (Java Bytecode or Common Intermediate Language). At runtime,
the just-in-time compiler may choose to convert this intermediate representation to
the native code, positioning the resulting code anywhere in the memory. After the
initial compilation of code, the just-in-time compiler can invalidate those functions
and recompile them to occupy a new address.
Another compiler feature that is relevant to the work presented here is header
pre-compilation, a feature supported by all the compilers mentioned here that gen-
erate native code. Unlike the techniques described in this document to help with
the analysis of programs, header pre-compilation is used to assist with the initial
compilation of the source code.
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Later in this work, a mechanism to improve the memory footprint of shared
libraries based on proling is discussed. Compilers use a similar mechanism to
optimize the hot paths in a program using a feedback loop. Programs are proled
after the initial compilation. The proling data is then fed back to the compiler to
optimize the instruction cache through function reordering, and to align basic blocks
on the hot path to avoid branching for a streamlined execution. Compilers can also
use this proling data to emit code that makes the runtime loader skip loading
unused functions into the memory; however, this feature is not yet supported by
any of the compilers listed above.
2.2 Binary Analysis and Editing Tools
Analyzing programs is necessary for understanding the program code and im-
proving its quality. However, not all program analysis is performed at the source
code level. Analyzing binary code is crucial for performance analysis and identify-
ing malicious software. Since machine code is not easily understandable by software
developers, special tools are needed to analyze binary programs. In this section, we
cover several such tools.
Dyninst is a runtime code patching library [11]. It provides an interface for
tool developers to inject instrumentation code into a program while it is running.
Users create their instrumentation using Dyninst's C++ application programming
interface (DyninstAPI). This instrumentation code is injected into the target pro-
gram at runtime. In addition to runtime instrumentation, Dyninst provides useful
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abstractions for modules, functions, control ow graphs, basic blocks, instructions,
and so on. These abstractions are accessible even if the application is not launched.
Hence, Dyninst can also be used for static analysis of binary programs. Moreover,
using Dyninst's rewriting functionality, the binary can be modied and then can
be rewritten to the disk so that the modied binary behaves dierently from the
original binary.
ATOM is another dynamic instrumentation tool that injects code into a run-
ning program and extracts information requested by the end user [76]. Its func-
tionalities are very similar to those of Dyninst. One dierence between ATOM and
Dyninst is that, unlike Dyninst, instrumentation code in ATOM and original code
use two separate copies of the same function if they both need to use it. ATOM
provides two methods for memory allocation by the instrumentation code. One of
these methods preserves the locations of heap allocated data structures used by the
original program, but it is inecient. The more ecient method intermingles heap
allocated memory by the original program and the instrumentation code. In this
second approach, data structures allocated by the original program may be placed
to distinct locations every time the program is run.
Vulcan is a dynamic instrumentation and binary rewriter tool from Microsoft
Research used for optimizations for code locality, procedure inlining, and cross-
component optimizations [75]. It is available on multiple architectures and pro-
vide many useful abstractions such as System, Program, Component, Procedure,
Basic Block, and Instruction. This tool has been used to merge Dynamic-Link
Libraries (i.e. DLLs), to apply aggressive cross-component optimizations, and to
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realign branches in binaries. Vulcan-instrumented binaries can also be rewritten to
the disk.
Pin is an instrumentation tool developed by Intel [59]. Like other instru-
mentation tools, it provides an interface to add code to a process at runtime. The
dierence in Pin's approach is that it applies just-in-time recompilation to the whole
executable. Whenever a new sequence of code is accessed, Pin compiles a copy of
that sequence along with all the instrumentation code and executes that copy. Pin
handles branching by intercepting taken branches, generating code for the branch
target, and executing this newly generated code. To reduce the performance penalty
of this approach, Pin performs optimizations such as trace linking (avoiding inter-
cepting code for known branch targets), inlining, and liveness analysis.
Another well-known instrumentation tool is Valgrind [65]. Like Pin, it executes
target programs using just-in-time compilation. Valgrind, too, provides various
abstractions and an intermediate language to hide platform-specic details from
end users. It is extensible through plugins called skins. One drawback of Valgrind
is that it runs target program on a simulated CPU hence it does not provide a high
execution speed. Besides, Valgrind has trouble working with self-modifying code.
Other dynamic instrumentation tools and rewriters include Shade [15], Dy-
namoRIO [9], EEL [52], and DELI [24].
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2.3 Binary Parsing
Parsing binary code has been studied extensively in the past. Since parsing
binaries usually requires disassembling machine code, most earlier work focuses on
this aspect of binary analysis. Several researchers created higher level representa-
tions of machine code following the disassembly. Examples of this approach include
Cifuentes and Gough with their decompiler, dcc [14], and Emmerik and Wadding-
ton with their Boomerang-based decompiler [28]. More recent work concentrates
on disassembly of obfuscated code to identify malicious software [49, 80]. Some re-
searchers, such as Aaraj et al. [1] and Guo et al. [36], combine static disassembly
techniques with dynamic analysis to cope with malware. Similarly, Bruschi et al.
attempt to identify malware by building a CFG from binary code and comparing
it with those of the known malware [10]. Disassembly techniques also made their
way into the mainstream applications: Many common tools such as gdb, objdump,
and IDA (formerly known as IDA Pro) [39] generate disassembly of binary les.
The work in Chapter 4 specically targets applications where the source code is
available, so code obfuscation is not an issue for our parsing eorts.
Many tools build CFGs once the executable le is disassembled. De Sutter's
[20] and Theiling's [79] control ow generation algorithms perform disassembly of
machine code followed by building basic blocks and nally CFGs using the disas-
sembled instructions. Cifuentes et al. [13] and Kiss et al. [45] perform intra- and
inter-procedural static slicing on binary les respectively, following disassembly and
CFG generation.
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All these systems make use of the debugging symbols whenever possible. Many
tools also perform a best-eort approach to identify function locations if the symbols
are not present. In one example, Harris and Miller demonstrate their tool that nds
and disassembles functions with a model that supports multiple entry points for each
function [37]. In another, Rosenblum et al. combine common recursive disassembly
of machine code with machine learning techniques to identify functions within the
gaps between known functions [70].
2.4 Memory Footprint Minimization
Reducing the memory footprint of programs has been extensively researched.
Earlier work includes a wide range of techniques from code compression [16, 21, 84,
55] to procedure abstraction [46, 47, 22] and dead code elimination [22].
Code compression is the act of reducing the size of program code by its equiva-
lent representation in another form [5]. It is usually applied to executables that run
on embedded systems. Xie et al. developed a system where only the instructions
that are the least frequently used are compressed [84]. Just like we do in Chapter 5,
they rst prole the executable and identify the regions that are the least likely to
be used. These regions are then compressed. They leave frequently accessed regions
uncompressed to reduce the performance hit. A decompressor generates the original
uncompressed code if a block of code that was compressed is accessed at runtime.
Lefurgy et al. evaluate a hardware assisted code compression system from IBM
PowerPC 405 [55]. In this system all program code is compressed. They note that
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they achieve performance increase in many situations thanks to faster prefetching of
instructions. Since their system relies on CodePack hardware support available on
PowerPC 405, it is restricted to this platform. Other approaches to code size reduc-
tion techniques include dead and redundant code elimination, procedure abstraction,
and instruction level modications [22, 23]. These methods are demonstrated in the
binary-rewriting tool squeeze along with interprocedural constant propagation and
strength reduction. Developers of squeeze also perform procedure extraction for
single entry-single exit sections at the binary level. Moreover, they make use of
various optimizations such as instruction reordering and platform specic improve-
ments such as reducing the cost of function prologues and epilogues. Van Put et al.
propose optimizations including constant propagation and unreachable code elimi-
nation as well as procedure extraction in their binary rewriter tool, DIABLO [81].
They also demonstrate how their system can be used to rewrite Linux kernel for
specic embedded systems. Komondoor and Horvitz propose procedure extraction
at the source code level [46, 47]. Zmily and Kozyrakis propose BLISS which suc-
cessfully targets reducing text space, energy use and execution time [87]. They
selectively replace 32-bit instructions with 16-bit instructions. Since more instruc-
tions t into the instruction cache, performance of the system increases. They also
remove repeated sequences of instructions leaving a single copy, just like procedure
extraction. Lau et al. show how echo instructions can be used to remove duplicates
of identical or similar regions of code [54]. `echo' is a proposed instruction that di-
rects processor to execute a sequence of instructions in the binary. Their proposed
system performs procedural abstraction and replaces similar sections of code with a
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single echo instruction.
Zhang and Krintz propose a system that unloads code regions from a modied
Java Virtual Machine after their execution is over [86]. They note that 61% of code is
only used at the start-up period and can be unloaded after their execution. Although
the system we describe in Chapter 5 currently does not unload code regions once
they are loaded, this functionality is a straightforward extension to our system.
One work that improves cache utilization and performance of the paging sys-
tem is carried out by Pettis and Hansen [68]. They present two strategies by carefully
repositioning code using execution proles. The rst strategy they employ is group-
ing functions so that callers and callees are placed close to each other. The second
strategy is moving basic blocks inside a function using proling data so that the
execution is streamlined and does not involve many jumps for the common case.
Basic blocks that are never used during training runs are then moved to the end
of the le as if they were a separate function. The main motivation behind this
rearrangement is to reduce the number of taken branches to help branch predictors.
Calder and Grunwald improved the Pettis and Hansen algorithm by adding a cost
model that reects architectural properties [12].
2.5 Randomization for Security
In Chapter 1, we mentioned relocating whole programs or their parts (i.e.
randomization) provided resistance against malicious attacks. Randomization tech-
niques have been around for about 10 years now. In this section, we cover some of
15
the well-known techniques for program randomization.
The PaX Team were the rst to introduce Address Space Layout Random-
ization (ASLR) [67], which has become the de facto standard for randomization.
The mechanism they developed loads segments of applications into random loca-
tions in the memory. Since attackers cannot easily guess where critical sections or
functions are located after this randomization, the likelihood of success diminishes.
However, ASLR has many limitations some of which are covered in Chapter 6. Xu
et al. worked on a similar system where randomization is provided by a modied
dynamic program loader with their Transparent Runtime Randomization (TRR)
work [85]. Besides program code, their system also relocates the Global Oset Ta-
ble (GOT) during program launch to provide more resistance against attacks. On
Windows, address space randomization was introduced by Li et al. [57]. Giurida et
al. developed a mechanism to enable address space randomization for the operating
system kernel [33]. Their approach uses a background process which periodically
randomizes OS components stored in LLVM bitcode le format1.
Address space randomization mechanism has also been applied to mobile de-
vices. Bojinov et al. introduced an ASLR-like system for Android devices [7]. Since
the Android OS prelinks shared libraries, applying address space randomization to
shared libraries at launch time does not work. On these devices shared libraries are
randomized every time prelinking is performed (i.e. during system updates). Since
then, Android 4.0 (Ice Cream Sandwich) introduced an early form of ASLR followed
by the implementation of full ASLR on Android 4.1 (Jelly Bean) [60].
1LLVM converts source code into an intermediate representation stored in its proprietary `bit-
code' le format.
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Shacham et al. evaluated the eectiveness of address space randomization
techniques on 32-bit and 64-bit architectures [72]. They showed that brute force
attacks are a big concern against services that fork many child processes. Since each
forked child retains the same memory layout as the parent process the attacker has
practically an innite number of processes to attack. This work also demonstrated
that the number of possible layouts on a 32-bit machine is only 216, making an
attack to succeed only in 216 seconds on average.
Randomization can also be applied to data. Kil et al. provided a system called
Data Space Randomization that can relocate stack, heap, and memory mapped re-
gions [44]. They also randomized program code as in ASLR. However, they need
specic relocation information attached to each binary le which is not available
by-default, forcing a recompilation of programs with specic compiler ags. An-
other work that focuses on data space randomization was conducted by Bhatkar
and Sekar [6]. Their system relies on keeping data elds encrypted until they are
used. Even if attackers can access to critical memory locations, any data they write
is considered junk as it cannot be decrypted correctly. Lin et al. introduced a dif-
ferent approach where stack variables and data elds in structures and classes are
randomized [58]. During compilation these elds and variables are reordered, and
junk data are inserted between each eld and variable to increase the power of the
obfuscation. However, distributing such software is problematic as the software has
to be compiled separately for each customer to provide more randomization.
Another defense approach is using canary values around the return addresses
stored on stack. StackGuard has been the rst work to oer protection for the
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return addresses [17]. It was later extended by Etoh and Yoda with Propolice
that reorders the stack frame and prevents buer overows from overwriting return
addresses [29]. Wang et al. used a taint-based detection mechanism to identify cases
where the return address is overwritten [82].
Yet another randomization technique for security is the Instruction-Set Ran-
domization [42]. In this approach, instructions that will be executed are stored in an
encrypted form and are only decrypted by the processor right before execution. Any
code injected by an attacker will, therefore, be invalid as it will not be encrypted
properly and will cause a crash. However, this approach requires a processor that
can decrypt instructions before executing them, and to date no general purpose
processors have been built with this feature. Boyd et al. extended this work to
interpreted languages and SQL [8]. Their system encrypts all keywords in the tar-
get language. When a keyword that is not encrypted correctly is encountered, it is
marked as malicious and is rejected by the system preventing any damage it could
cause.
Antonatos et al. extended the randomization idea to network addresses to
prevent hit-list attacks2 with their Network Address Space Randomization (NASR)
work [3]. They indicated that services should obtain a new IP-Address periodically
so that when a hit-list attack is launched, the target will not be located at the
specied IP-Address and, therefore, will be saved.
Wartell et al.'s work on Binary Stirring is similar to our work in the sense that
2To increase the speed of infection, some worms attack a list of potentially vulnerable machines
before employing random attacks. This attack style is named hit-list attack.
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they also employ self-randomization of binary code [83]. However, the randomization
takes place only once at launch-time, leaving the executables vulnerable when they
spawn new children, just like the ASLR. Another similar work to ours is the recent
work by Curtsinger and Berger [18]. Their self-relocation system moves functions at
runtime to perform consistent performance evaluation. Since the main purpose of
this work is to create a performance analysis of applications, and not to introduce
randomization, relocated functions are still accessible from their initial locations.
Clearly, this approach will not enhance security. Moreover, unlike our work, this




Instrumentation with Relocatable Basic Blocks
This chapter explains our eorts in creating individually relocatable basic
blocks. First, we discuss ways to make basic blocks relocatable. Then we talk
about how our compilation mechanism can create these basic blocks. We continue
to explain how these basic blocks are instrumented, and the benets of using these
basic blocks. We end with our running time experiments and a discussion of the
techniques described in this chapter.
3.1 Overview
A basic block is a region of code that has a single entry and a single exit
point. Execution of a basic block can only start from the rst instruction in the
basic block; there cannot be any jump targets inside a basic block except the very
rst instruction. All instructions in a basic block are guaranteed to execute when
the rst instruction is executed, as long as there are no exceptions.
The fact that all instructions in a basic block get executed either altogether
or not at all makes basic blocks a natural abstraction for many analyses and data
structures. Researchers have repeatedly selected basic block granularity in their
work. Examples include Control Flow Graphs where nodes represent basic blocks,
and rearrangement of basic blocks to minimize branching. In this chapter, we also
use basic block granularity to generate relocatable code segments.
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We believe programs should be as exible as possible. Code should execute
correctly wherever it is located. This exibility can only be satised if the code is
made relocatable. Relocatable code generation has been supported to some extent
by various compilers for decades. Shared library code is compiled into position inde-
pendent code (PIC) since a shared library can be loaded anywhere in the memory.
In this chapter we show benets of making individual basic blocks relocatable. Our
system generates relocatable basic blocks not just for shared libraries but also for
statically linked executable les.
Relocating a regular basic block is not a straightforward process: if a basic
block moves, addresses that are used inside that basic block and addresses that refer
to it have to be modied with respect to the new location of that basic block. Clearly,
these modications are unaordable at runtime. In the following sections we rst
describe how we generate relocatable basic blocks and then discuss the performance
of various techniques we investigated.
3.2 Relocatable Basic Blocks
A basic block can only be relocated if the code it contains is not position-
dependent. Therefore, any le that needs to be relocatable has to be compiled into
position-independent code. Binary les compiled into position-independent code
are only relocatable as a whole and any particular basic block in these les is not
relocatable by itself. Branch instructions refer to other basic blocks and contain
some form of addressing even in position-independent code. If either the branch
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instruction or the branch target is relocated, the target for that branch instruction
will not be computed correctly at runtime. Therefore, branch instructions in our
relocatable basic blocks do not contain addresses of targets. Instead, target addresses
are looked up at runtime. In our approach, addresses of basic blocks are stored in
a table. Branch instructions use this table to identify the locations of target basic
blocks.
We investigate three techniques to create relocatable basic blocks, as seen in
Figure 3.1. All of these techniques involve a table called Basic-block Linkage Table
(BLT) that is responsible for directing execution to the target basic block. This in-
direction introduces some level of runtime overhead. Our three approaches represent
dierent points in the design space of trading ease of relocation and performance.
The rst technique we tried makes branch instructions jump to the BLT, as
seen in Figure 3.1(b). Entries in the BLT contain branch instructions themselves.
These branch instructions read target addresses from another table called Target
Address Table (TAT). Branch instructions in the BLT can then transfer execution
to the correct target. We call this technique BLT with TAT.
The second technique avoids one level of indirection by using the BLT to store
target addresses and eliminating the need for the Target Address Table (Figure
3.1(c)). Each branch instruction jumps to the BLT which in turn jumps to the target
address encoded inside BLT. This technique is as powerful as the rst technique with
better runtime performance, but addresses are intermingled with jump instructions.
This technique is called BLT Only.
The third technique, as seen in Figure 3.1(d), benets from fall-through edges
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Figure 3.1: Relocatable Basic Block Creation Techniques: (a) Unmodied branch-
ing. (b) Basic Block Linkage Table (BLT) with Target Address Table (TAT). (c)
Basic Block Linkage Table Only. (d) Basic Block Linkage Table with Fall-Through
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while decreasing exibility for relocating basic blocks that terminate with one. In
this technique, branches that target the next instruction are removed and execution
falls-through into the next basic block. However, once we relocate the source or the
target basic block, we have to insert a branch instruction at the end of the source
basic block so that execution still follows the correct execution path. This technique
is called BLT with FT where FT is an abbreviation for Fall-through, and oers the
best performance among these three techniques.
Table 3.1 summarizes the actions taken during the generation of relocatable
basic blocks. In this table, we list the modications to branch and call instructions as
well as to fall-through edges while using any of the three techniques we described ear-
lier. Our system treats call instructions as fall-through edges. Conditional branches
require special care as they have 2 targets. After our transformations, generated
basic blocks do not strictly obey the `basic block' denition for `BLT with TAT' and
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Figure 3.2: Compilation mechanism: a) Regular compiler. b) Our compiler: It
generates an intermediate assembly le and augments it with tables.
`BLT Only'; however, for simplicity, we still refer to them as `basic blocks'.
3.3 Compilation
In Sect. 3.2, we discussed the types of relocatable basic blocks. In this section,
we explain how they are created. An overview is given in Figure 3.2.
In order to create relocatable basic blocks, we rst compile source code into
a position-independent intermediate representation using the -fPIC ag. This in-
termediate representation allows us to operate on basic blocks and generate branch
instructions to/from a BLT as described in Table 3.1. We selected assembly code
as our intermediate representation to have more control on the nal executable, but
we could have used any other intermediate representation as well. At this stage, we
only use labels to represent basic blocks as their nal addresses are not known in
this intermediate representation. Then, this modied intermediate representation is
compiled into an object le just like any other assembly code. Object les are then
in turn linked to create executables.
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To allow seamless generation of relocatable basic blocks, we developed a wrap-
per for gcc and g++. This wrapper acts like a regular C/C++ compiler and supports
all ags supported by gcc and g++. We also created a simple parser for the assembly
code. This parser identies boundaries of basic blocks and modies the assembly
code generated during the rst phase of the compilation. In the assembly code, most
basic blocks are already labeled as they are usually targets of branch instructions.
However, there are often basic blocks that are only reachable through a fall-through
edge. As fall-through edges do not require any branching, these basic blocks are not
labeled. Our parser identies these basic blocks and appends labels to them so that
they can be used as targets from BLT.
3.4 Instrumentation
Code modication, or code patching, is the act of updating program code out-
side of the compile-link-load-execute cycle. It can be performed at various steps of
the compilation process like pre-compile-time using source-to-source translators, or
compile and link-time through compiler passes. For this work, we are only interested
in post-link-time code modication (i.e. launch-time and runtime). In post-link-time
code modication, program code is modied only after the executable is fully com-
piled and linked. Reasons for postponing code modication until this phase range
from unavailability of source code for legacy and third party executables to the need
to observe the eects of compiler optimizations.
Code layout has been traditionally determined by compilers which arrange the
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Figure 3.3: Runtime Patching of Basic Block B with regular basic blocks and Relo-
catable Basic Blocks. (a) Patching a regular basic block normally requires moving it
and modifying any address references. (b) With relocatable basic blocks, patching
is done in place. (c) If there is not enough room, the target of the patch is moved
with very little change in the original code.
layout of individual object les, and linkers which arrange the layout of fully-linked
executable les. After linking, all functions and global data have a xed location
within the executable. There usually is not enough room to move any functions
or data in this packed layout. As a result, whenever code modication is needed,
all basic blocks that are aected are usually moved to the end of the program text
and patched there, as seen in Figure 3.3(a). Unconditional branches targeting these
basic blocks are inserted at the original locations of these basic blocks. With this
approach, the execution can continue after a small disruption. This is the common
way tools such as Dyninst [11] perform runtime code modication.
With our approach, these adjustments are mostly unnecessary. Since basic
blocks are relocatable, code patching operations do not have to deal with moving
the basic blocks and adding branching logic to jump to these blocks. The patch is
directly applied as shown in Figure 3.3(b). If basic blocks have to be moved to make
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space for modications as in Figure 3.3(c), they are simply moved to new locations
and associated BLT or TAT entry is updated to point to their new locations.
The rst step to achieve runtime code modication in our system is the same
as the rst step of traditional instrumentation systems: Users identify the location
where instrumentation code will be inserted. Then, the space requirement for the
instrumented code is computed by our system. If the target basic block does not have
room to grow, it is moved to a new location and associated BLT entry is updated.
This step is fairly simple due to the relocatability property of basic blocks. Finally,
Instrumentation code is inserted in the target basic block.
Instrumentation is a broad topic, and dealing with some of the required com-
ponents of instrumentation such as parsing binary les and generating instrumenta-
tion code is beyond the scope of the work presented in this chapter. Therefore, we
made use of Dyninst's already available features to analyze binary code and generate
instrumentation.
3.5 Benets
In this work, we developed a simpler instrumentation mechanism than a com-
mon instrumentation tool employs. Our approach is based on Dyninst which is
already a fully-functional tool; therefore, we put our eort into simplifying this tool,
rather than adding new functionality.
During a traditional instrumentation, a basic block is relocated to new mem-
ory, and a branch instruction is inserted in the old location. If there are multiple
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modications at a given point, snippets of instrumentation are inserted into the
program image, and they are linked with branch instructions, forming a chain of
instrumentation snippets. Our system does not use this logic as it can easily relocate
basic blocks. Moreover, our tool can generate inlined instrumentation1. Inserting a
branch to the original location of an instrumented basic block can be problematic
when the relocated basic block is smaller than the required branch instruction. Tra-
ditional instrumentation tools set up a trap2 to redirect execution in these cases.
Since relocatable basic blocks do not need these branches, traps are also not neces-
sary. Therefore, relocatable basic blocks can be instrumented without complicated
trap logic.
Relocatable basic blocks can also decrease the number of branches if the binary
is instrumented heavily. Traditionally, if a basic block B is instrumented, execution
has to go through the original location of B to jump to the instrumented block.
With relocatable basic blocks, this jump might be unnecessary if the source basic
block already looks up the address of the target basic block from the BLT. If most
blocks are instrumented, the savings might be considerable.
3.6 Experimental Results
In this section, we present our ndings about the overhead caused by relocat-
able basic blocks and how running times for instrumented binaries compare.
1Current version of Dyninst also inlines instrumentation code and performs full function relo-
cation for instrumented functions. We observed the improvement described here over an earlier
version of Dyninst that was the most recent release when this work was performed.
2A trap is set by using a specic instruction. Executing that instruction raises an operating
system signal.
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Figure 3.4: Running Time Comparison of Relocatable Basic Block Techniques on
Quicksort. y-axis shows the amount of time each code version takes to nish in
seconds.
First, we measured the overhead caused by relocatable basic blocks on four
versions of an implementation of the quicksort algorithm. To generate these four
executables, we rst converted the source code into assembly language with gcc using
-fPIC ag. We modied the resulting assembly code with respect to the strategy
we used. We executed each version of the program, including the original. We took
an average of the running times across ve runs of each version.
Figure 3.4 shows the running times for the original and three alternative code
generation techniques. The y axis shows the actual running times of each application
while the number inside each bar shows the normalized running time for that version
of the program. BLT with TAT performs the worst with a 25% slowdown. Programs
with BLT with FT are almost as fast as unmodied programs (2% slowdown was
inevitable since our example program included some loops that required taking
branches using BLT), while the code is relocatable at the granularity of a small
number of basic blocks. However, in this approach, basic blocks that end with fall-
through edges have to be appended with branches to replace these fall-through edges
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Figure 3.5: Normalized Running Times with Relocatable Basic Blocks
when they are relocated. We claim this slight restriction on exibility is worth the
substantially reduced runtime overhead. Fully exible code provided with BLT with
TAT is not as practical as other options due to the high cost on the performance.
Therefore, we stopped considering it as a practical option at this point, and we have
not run other tests using this strategy.
The next step in our evaluation was to measure the running times of the SPEC
CINT 2006 benchmarks compiled with and without relocatable basic blocks. Figure
3.5 shows normalized running times of these benchmarks on the reference data set.
Our results showed that BLT with FT performs about 9% slower on average than the
original executables built with gcc. BLT only, on the other hand, performs almost
60% slower on average. These results also show that the most practical strategy to
create relocatable basic blocks is to allow fall-through edges between basic blocks.
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Figure 3.6: Running Times of Instrumented Binaries with Relocatable Basic Blocks
In our next experiment, we compared the running times of binaries instru-
mented with original Dyninst and our version of Dyninst that is capable of making
use of relocatable basic blocks. During instrumentation, Dyninst generates copies of
functions that contain both instrumentation code and original code. When a func-
tion is instrumented again, the instrumentation is applied to the original function
and not to the copies. Therefore, only basic blocks in the original function need to
be relocatable. Our instrumentation tool inlines instrumentation code and relocates
functions as a whole. Figure 3.6 shows the running times of original and instru-
mented mcf executables. We used three techniques to create these executables: We
compiled the program with gcc, with BLT with FT, and with BLT only. mcf with
BLT only takes more time to nish than the one with BLT with FT, and even more
time than the one with gcc; however, after the instrumentation, all three versions
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Figure 3.7: Instruction Counts with Relocatable Basic Blocks
of the instrumented mcf executable run at about the same speed. These results
show us that executables built with one of our techniques do not perform worse
after the instrumentation, and we should consider building executables with one of
our techniques if we expect to instrument them, as instrumentation of executables
built with our technique is simpler than instrumentation of executables built with
a regular compiler.
Inevitably, executables built with one of our compilation techniques perform
worse than executables built with a regular compiler when there is no instrumen-
tation. We wanted to make sure that this slowdown comes from the fact that we
execute more branches for executables built with our techniques. Therefore, we
measured the number of executed instructions and number of taken branches on the
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mcf benchmark using the hardware counters available on the system. Figure 3.6
shows that the increase in the number of executed instructions matches the increase
in the number of taken branches, suggesting that the slowdown is merely a result of
executing these extra branch instructions.
3.7 Discussion
This work demonstrated the benets of using relocatable basic blocks and
the overheads associated with using them. Instrumentation with relocatable basic
blocks is simpler, and tools for instrumenting these binaries are easier to build.
Moreover, instrumented executables with our mechanism run as fast as instrumented
executables with original Dyninst that is more complex than our system.
However, relocatable basic blocks can be impractical as the benets may not
outweigh the drawbacks in all situations. In our work, we arrived at the conclusion
that tool builders prefer creating tools with better performance even though building
these tools takes more time due to their complexity. As a result, we did not take
relocatable basic blocks idea further and applied our ideas about relocatable code
to other program constructs in our later work as described in Chapters 5 and 6.
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced a novel mechanism to create individually relo-
catable basic blocks. Relocatable basic blocks provide more exibility than shared
libraries that have to occupy a contiguous space in memory. Our relocatable basic
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blocks can move around in the memory. This exibility provides an easier runtime
instrumentation opportunity for tool builders.
Executables with relocatable basic blocks run slower than regular executables
due to the increased number of branches that provide relocatability. When instru-
mented, both executables with relocatable basic blocks and regular executables run
at about the same speed. Therefore, we believe executables should be built with
relocatable basic blocks if users anticipate to instrument them.
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Chapter 4
Compiler Help for Binary Analysis Tools
In Chapter 3 we discussed one approach to simplify instrumentation via relo-
catable basic blocks. In this chapter, we introduce another approach towards the
same goal: a compilation mechanism that speeds up binary parsing operations. We
describe the diculties of binary parsing, followed by our approach and how it sim-
plies the creation of Control Flow Graphs. Finally, we present our experimental
results.
4.1 Overview
Binary analysis is a common operation for performance modeling [51, 63],
computer security [27, 74], maintenance [14, 40], and binary modication [19, 69, 80].
Each of these tasks requires parsing the executable le to identify functions, data
segments, and their interaction with each other. However, parsing executables is
not a straightforward task and it is painfully slow since it usually requires decoding
every single instruction in the binary.
At the higher level, even distinguishing code and data is dicult since they
are often stored in adjacent memory. It is usually hard to draw the conclusion that
a sequence of code constitutes a function, especially when it is not accessed via
a statically identiable call or branch instruction. Therefore, even seemingly-easy
tasks such as locating functions might be daunting if the le is stripped from its
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symbols. At the lower level, identifying instructions in a binary is not a simple
task either, especially for the variable-length instruction set architectures such as
the x86. When the start of an instruction is not known for certain, the problem of
distinguishing data and code is even harder to solve. Various analyses use dierent
methods and almost all of them make use of the available symbols included in the
executable le.
All the information about functions and data locations is actually known dur-
ing various stages of compilation. Compilers decide where each of the components
in a binary should be located. They know what is data and what is program code.
They know where each function is placed, and they know the boundaries of the
instructions. They also have the complete information about the locations of basic
blocks and edges between them. They use all this information to build executable
les, and then throw away most of the information used during this process. Only
some information is stored in the binary in the form of symbols. Binary analysis
tools that operate on these executables have to regenerate the information that is
thrown away by the compiler.
In this chapter, we propose a novel compilation mechanism that stores use-
ful information about the layout of executable les in tables inside executable les.
These tables enable identication of basic blocks and provide support for reconstruc-
tion of edges between them. Binary analysis tools that make use of these tables can
parse executables faster and more reliably. We measured a speed-up in parsing up
to 4.4x with an average speed-up of 3.8x. Since these tables are stored in a section
that is not loaded into the memory during execution, the memory footprint of exe-
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cutables do not change. Running times of these executables also remain unchanged
since we do not in any way modify the execution. The overhead in the compilation
time and the increase in le size is manageable - both values measured to be 23%.
At the moment, this compilation mechanism and related binary analysis tools are
supported on the x86_64 architecture and with the gnu compiler suite.
4.2 Diculties of Binary Parsing
Parsing is not trivial. To motivate our compiler based approach, we briey
review some of the parsing related challenges.
The rst challenge in parsing the machine code is distinguishing code from
data. Since both code and data are stored the same way, there is really no easy way of
identifying whether a sequence of bytes correspond to code or data. Current parsing
techniques use hints to identify code and mark the remaining bytes as data. These
hints usually come in the form of symbols in the binary. Symbols that represent
functions indicate where those functions start. Binary analysis tools mark the bytes
addressed by these symbols as function entry points. From this point on, tools
either follow a sweeping or a recursive strategy [71]. In the sweeping strategy, tools
rst use symbols to mark an initial set of functions, then sweep the remaining
bytes from the start of the le and mark sequences of bytes that resemble code
as program code. In the recursive strategy, tools also start by using symbols to
mark the initial set of functions. Starting from these functions, tools then locate
other code sections following call edges1 and marking call targets as function entry
1Some function invocations are performed using branch instructions. The sequence of bytes
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points, hence program code. In some cases, uncharted regions in the binary are then
plugged into machine learning algorithms to identify even more functions and code
regions [70].
Functions are composed of one or more, usually several, basic blocks. A basic
block is a sequence of instructions that contains no control ow instructions except
as the last instruction of the block. If the rst instruction in a basic block executes,
it is guaranteed that all following instructions will execute. It is an abstraction that
is used by many types of analyses.
Once the functions are identied, their Control Flow Graphs (CFGs) are built.
A CFG is a graph whose nodes are basic blocks and whose edges represent the
interactions between basic blocks. It can be considered as a reachability graph
starting from the function entry point. A sample CFG can be seen in Figure 4.1.
The function in this sample contains an entry block, two blocks that represent an
If/Else (labeled True and False) structure, and an exit block. Building such a CFG
correctly depends on correct identication of basic blocks and the edges between
these basic blocks. Therefore, it requires the analysis tool to inspect each instruction
in a function. This operation is error-prone, especially on variable-length instruction
set architectures where an error in decoding an instruction propagates downstream
and make decoding the following instructions harder, or even impossible. Since each
instruction has to be decoded and analyzed, building a CFG is very costly. This cost
matters because building a CFG is the rst step for most binary analysis algorithms.
addressed by branch instructions is also considered code.
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Figure 4.1: A sample CFG and associated Basic Block and Edge Tables of a function
with entry basic block, an If/Else structure, a loop, and an exit block.
4.3 Compiler Help
During the build process, compilers construct an internal representation of the
source code and generate machine code using this internal representation. However,
as soon as the executable le is generated, this internal representation is thrown
away. In this chapter, we investigate the eects of storing some of this knowledge
about the program inside the generated executable.
In the previous section, we explained that building CFGs is a precursor to
most binary analysis algorithms and that building a CFG requires identifying basic
blocks and edges between them. Most of the time spent while parsing an executable
le is used to gather this information. We demonstrate how storing this information
inside the executable le speeds up the parsing process. Moreover, we show that
the extra information stored in the executable le does not change the speed of
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Figure 4.2: Formats of Basic Block and Edge Tables: The rst line shows the format
of the Basic Block Table whereas the second line shows the format of the Edge Table.
execution of the program or the size of the memory image of the program. The
following subsections explain what extra information is stored and how it is used.
4.3.1 Basic Block and Edge Tables
To speed up building basic block abstractions inside binary analysis tools, we
developed a compilation framework that stores the start address2 and the address of
the last instruction of each basic block inside the executable in what we call a Basic
Block Table. The format of this table is shown in Figure 4.2 a). To create a basic
block abstraction, tools can read the rst eld and nd out where that basic block
is located. The second eld is used for gathering information about edges. A more
detailed discussion about this eld will follow after we introduce the Edge Table.
CFGs also require the identication of edges between basic blocks. Our system
stores the source basic block, the target basic block, and the edge type of each edge
in the Edge Table. In this table, a basic block is identied by its start address. The
format of this table is shown in Figure 4.2 b). In some cases, target basic block
in an edge can only be known during the actual execution of the program. Such
cases occur when value of a function pointer or any sort of indirect branch target3
2The values used as address are osets from the start of the function. We leave the discussion
on using osets rather than absolute addresses to Section 4.3.2
3Although indexed jump tables also use indirect branches, targets of such indirect branch in-
structions can usually be identied using heuristics. Targets cannot be identied if heuristics do
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depends on the program inputs. In these cases, we leave the target basic block eld
blank during generation of the Basic Block Table. Such edges can be lled in by the
parser after the program has launched and when the value of the target address can
be computed through the analysis of the last instruction of the source basic block.
The last instruction of a basic block is also accessed when binary analysis tools need
to modify the CFG. Updating the last instruction in a basic block to change the
target of that basic block modies the edge, and thus is a common CFG update
operation. Clearly, we need a quick way to access the last instruction of each basic
block. Therefore, we store the address of the last instruction in our Basic Block
Table along with the start address of that basic block.
Basic Block and Edge Tables shown in Figure 4.1 are based on the CFG from
the same gure. For this example, assume a is the oset of the last instruction
of the rst basic block from the start of the function, c is the oset of the last
instruction of the second basic block, and so on. Since there are 4 basic blocks in
the CFG, the Basic Block table has 4 rows. The rst row represents the rst basic
block: it starts at oset 0, and its last instruction is located at oset a. The second
basic block starts at oset b, and its last instruction is located at oset c, and so
on. The Basic Block Table is followed by the Edge Table which has 5 rows, one for
each edge between basic blocks. The edges from the entry basic block to the True
and False blocks are shown in the rst two rows. The edge from the entry block
to the True block is represented with the triplet of <0, d, Conditional> since it is
accessed by taking a conditional branch. The edge from the entry block to the False
not work, or if indirect branch instructions do not use an indexed jump table.
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block is traversed when the conditional branch is not taken and when execution
simply falls-through4 to the False block. The last row in the gure represents the
edge originating from the return instruction. Since the target of a return instruction
cannot be determined statically, that eld is left blank (marked with N/A in our
example).
4.3.2 Compilation Process
Our compilation mechanism mimics a standard compilation process from the
end-user's point of view as much as possible. We developed a tool that modies
assembly les and generates Basic Block and Edge Tables. This approach was chosen
because no compilers we are aware of are able to generate the tables that we need.
We considered modifying an open-source compiler and generating the tables directly
using this compiler; however, this approach would require substantial development
time. Therefore, we decided to defer this task and instead modify the intermediate
binary les. Using an LLVM [53] pass was another approach we considered but
did not take to avoid unintentional optimizations LLVM applies to binaries with its
standard passes.
Figure 4.3 shows an overview of our compilation process: a) shows regular
compilation where source code is converted into an object le directly by the com-
piler. Our compilation process is shown in b). We rst convert source code into an
assembly le. Our assembly modication tool then generates Basic Block and Edge
4`Fall-through' is a type of control transfer where the execution of an instruction is followed by
the execution of the next instruction in the address space of the executable.
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Figure 4.3: Compilation Mechanism for Basic Block and Edge Table Creation: a)
Regular compiler. b) Our compiler: It generates an intermediate assembly le and
augments it with tables: Basic Block Table (BBT) and Edge Table (ET).
Tables. The assembly code is then rewritten to disk and it is appended with one
Basic Block Table and one Edge Table per function. For our purposes, the critical
information about programs is still available at the assembly level. The formats of
these tables were discussed in Section 4.3.1. This augmented assembly le is nally
converted to an object le.
In order to generate Basic Block and Edge Tables, our assembly modication
tool has to go over the assembly code and identify functions. Figure 4.4 shows
original and augmented assembly les. In the context of assembly les, functions
are regions of code in the .text section and are identied by @function markers. At
the end of the function block, a .size directive is used to calculate the size of the
function. Each function contains one or more, usually several, basic blocks. Basic
blocks either start at a label (when it is the target of some branch instruction),
or right after a call or a branch instruction as the fall-through target. Once the
boundaries of basic blocks are identied, our tool also marks the last instruction in
each basic block.
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Next, our assembly modication tool identies the edges between basic blocks.
It reads the last instruction of each basic block, determines the type of the edge (e.g.
call, return, (un)conditional branch), and nds out the target basic block if possible.
There may be more than one target for some instructions such as conditional branch
instructions which have a branch target and a fall-through target.
Once the basic blocks and edges are identied, our tool rewrites the assembly
le as shown in Figure 4.4 b). Our parser adds Basic Block and Edge Tables to the
end of the function in a section we call .edge_info. We mark this section with a ag
to indicate it should not be loaded into memory during execution.
One minor trick in the implementation is the need to support position inde-
pendent code as well as position dependent code. Using absolute addressing does
not work for position independent code. To handle this, all the addresses in these
tables are stored as osets from the start of the function.
Another issue arises when duplicate function denitions are merged by the
linker. During the build process les that are linked with the include directive from
a source le are compiled along with the actual source le. As a result all function
denitions included from a header le are compiled into the resulting object le. If
the same functions are linked from multiple source les, these functions will appear
in multiple object les that result from the compilation of these source les. To
avoid linking problems, these functions are marked as weak. Linkers allow only
one copy of these weak functions to appear in the nal executable - the remaining
ones are dropped. Although these functions are identical at the source code level,
since compilers perform optimizations individually on each copy of the function, the
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Figure 4.4: Regular vs. Augmented Assembly Files: a) A function is shown in
assembly format. Anything between @function marker and .size directive is consid-
ered part of the function. b) The function is augmented with Basic Block and Edge
Tables, and a shadow symbol to store the le name.
resulting machine code may be structurally dierent. As a result, Basic Block and
Edge Tables for these functions may dier slightly.
Unlike weak functions, tables with the same name cannot be merged. There-
fore, our compilation mechanism has to distinguish tables related to functions that
have the same name. Therefore, we generate table names using a combination of
the function name and the name of the le that contains that function. At the end,
each table has a dierent name. We also store a shadow symbol inside each function
that shows the name of the le where this function is dened5.
When weak functions are merged, only one such symbol survives. We use that
symbol to identify the name of the le that contains the weak function that made
its way into the nal executable. Binary analysis tools can nd the corresponding
5The shadow symbol for function foo in Figure 4.4 is foo_<le_name> where <le_name> is
the actual le name of the source.
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tables using the le name and function name tuple.
When this rewrite operation of the assembly code is complete, it is assembled
into the requested output format such as an executable le or an object le, or
simply left as an assembly le.
Our tool supports standard gcc ags. Flags that are not used by our com-
pilation mechanism are passed to the underlying system-supported compiler. The
ags that determine the requested output format such as -c, -o, and -S are handled
specially by our tool and are not passed to the system compiler to avoid creating
output les prematurely. We also provide wrappers for standard compilers in gnu
compiler suite. These wrappers, along with the fact that we pass user-specied ags
directly to the underlying compiler, provide a seamless end-user experience.
4.3.3 Reconstruction
Parsing binaries is considerably easier when Basic Block and Edge Tables are
available. Any binary analysis tool rst has to nd the location of each table. At
that point, the name of the function that is being parsed is known by the tool.
Using the function name, the tool searches for the shadow symbol and extracts the
le name from this shadow symbol once it is found. The tables are then located
using the combination of the function name and the le name. Once the tables are
found, the tool reads in the information regarding the location of each basic block
and its last instruction. At the end of this step the basic blocks are created, and
the locations of their last instructions are known.








Figure 4.5: Interaction between Compilers and Binary Analysis Tools: Our compiler
creates executable les with Basic Block and Edge Tables. Binary analysis tools
parse these executables using these tables.
table contains a triplet: the address of the source basic block, the address of the
target basic block, and the type of the edge. Since the start address of a basic block
uniquely identies that basic block, this triplet has all the information the tool needs
to build the edge abstraction.
As we mentioned earlier, all addresses in these tables are stored as osets from
the start address of the function in hand. To calculate the exact location of a basic
block, our tool adds the start address of this function to the value read from these
tables.
Figure 4.5 demonstrates the relationship between our compilation infrastruc-
ture and binary analysis tools: Our compiler converts the source code into executable
les whereas binary analysis tools operate on executable les directly. Binary anal-
ysis tools do not interact with our compiler. Therefore, any binary analysis tool can
implement the functionality to read the tables stored in these executable les. We
built our binary analysis tool based on Dyninst [11] since it is a popular open-source
binary analysis library. We modied the ParseAPI component and only rewrote a
few functions to allow Dyninst to use the data from our tool.
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4.4 Evaluation
For evaluation, we used a simple binary modication tool we built on top
of Dyninst. Our tool reads in a binary le and rewrites it to disk with simple
instrumentation code for basic block counting. Since our analysis deals with every
single basic block in the executable, the executable le has to be parsed from top
to bottom correctly locating every basic block.
We evaluated our system on a variety of benchmarks to determine how well our
system handles executables with dierent properties. We rst evaluated our system
on SPEC CINT2006 [38, 61]. SPEC CINT2006 contains a series of CPU-intensive
executables that are selected to evaluate the processor(s) and the memory system.
All together, SPEC CINT2006 has about 1,047,000 lines of code.
Our next benchmarks were the PETSc libraries and their sample applications
[4]. PETSc (Portable, Extensible Toolkit for Scientic Computation) is a suite of
data structures and routines for the scalable (parallel) solution of scientic appli-
cations modeled by partial dierential equations. It uses MPI for parallelization.
It has linear and non-linear equation solvers and supports C, C++, Fortran and
Python. The PETSc suite is composed of about 872,000 lines of code.
Finally we evaluated our system on the popular web browser Firefox (version
9.0.1) [64] and all the shared libraries that ship with the Firefox source code. We
evaluated our system on Firefox because its executables are numerous and are rela-
tively large. Moreover, it contains hand-written assembly les and the build process
involves using many uncommon compiler options. Therefore, building Firefox has
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been a valuable test for the robustness of our compilation mechanism. The Firefox
suite contains approximately 5,335,000 lines of code.
4.4.1 Environment
All experiments were carried out on 64-bit x86 machines that run Linux oper-
ating system.
SPEC CINT2006 and PETSc benchmarks were tested on a system that has
4 Intel Xeon processors with 6-cores each, all clocked at 2.4GHz. It has a total
of 48GB main memory. All our executables except PETSc executables were serial
applications including our own analysis. Therefore, we ran most of our experiments
serially on a single core. Since the purpose of our work is not parallel evaluation, we
only used 6 cores for PETSc. Using 6 cores gave us enough parallelization to nish
executions in a reasonable time. In our experiments, the extra cores were not used
and left to the operating system as a way to reduce operating system jitter. We used
gcc 4.1.2 for building reference executables and as a back-end to our compilation
mechanism.
Firefox experiments were run on a separate machine due to the idiosyncratic
requirements of the Firefox build environment. As a result, Firefox runs were taken
on a dual-core machine with an AMD Turion processor at 1.8 GHz with 2GB main
memory. Since we never compare results across these machines directly, the results
are not aected due to using two dierent machines. On this system, we used gcc
4.6.1 for building reference executables and as our back-end.
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4.4.2 Experimental Results
Our rst experiment was designed to calculate the time it takes to parse a
specic executable using our analysis tool to show how much our tool improves
parsing speed. We then ran other experiments to evaluate properties of executables
built using our compilation mechanism and identify any trade-os. In this regard, we
compared the compilation times using our tool versus a standard compiler. Similarly,
we compared le sizes after the compilation process. At the end, we tested the
runtime performance of these executables in terms of time and memory usage. We
ran each experiment that measures elapsed time 5 times and computed the mean.
We then normalized our ndings with respect to the executables compiled with
regular gnu compiler suite.
In our experiments, we observed that using basic block and edge tables reduced
the parsing time between 58% and 77%, and on average by 73%. Although the le
sizes increase by 23% on average, we believe this situation is not prohibitive since
the basic block and edge tables are not loaded into memory during the execution
of these binary les. We also observed about 23% increase in the compilation time.
Since this is only a one time cost that appears while building executables, and it can
be improved drastically by integrating the creation of basic block and edge tables
into the compiler rather than leaving as a separate assembly pass, we believe this
increase is acceptable.
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Figure 4.6: SPEC CINT2006 Benchmarks: Normalized Parsing Times
4.4.2.1 Experimental Parsing Results
Figure 4.6 shows the normalized parsing times with SPEC CINT2006 bench-
marks with respect to regular parsing6. We observed a high percentage of speed-up
across the board while the average binary parse speed-up is 3.7x (73% improvement
over original parsing time).
Our next tests were carried out on executables in the snes package of the
PETSc suite and the results are shown in Figure 4.7. One interesting characteristic
of PETSc executables is that PETSc libraries are statically linked into the executable
les during compilation. As a result, each executable contains all functions in the
PETSc libraries. With the help of our compilation mechanism, we reduced the
6Note that gcc is a benchmark in SPEC CINT2006. We built this benchmark with our compi-
lation mechanism and compared parsing times with the parsing times of the same benchmark (i.e.
gcc) built with the system supported gcc compiler.
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Figure 4.7: PETSc Example Applications: Normalized Parsing Times
parsing time 76% on average (4.2x speed-up). Due to static linking of all these
PETSc libraries in every executable, parsing time is more or less at across all
executables in this set because our tool parses mostly the same set of functions for
each executable.
As a nal set of executables, we decided to use the Firefox executable and all
shared libraries that ship with Firefox. Figure 4.8 shows the normalized parsing time
of executables from Firefox. For this set of runs, we operated on those executables
that reside in memory when the Firefox web browser is launched. We see a major
improvement in parsing time once more as expected. The average drop in the parsing
time is 71% (3.5x speed-up) with the worst case reduction of 58%.
As the previous results show, our system considerably increases the parsing
speed. Now we want to discuss other evaluation metrics such as le size, compilation
time, and memory footprint of executables compiled with basic block and edge
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Figure 4.8: Firefox Executables: Normalized Parsing Times
tables.
4.4.2.2 Build Time Metrics
Table 4.1 gives an overview of our experimental results regarding build time
and runtime metrics. In this section, we will discuss the build time metrics: le size
and compilation time.
Table 4.1: Properties of Executables Built with Basic Block and Edge Tables (All
numbers are normalized)
Benchmark Set
File Size Compilation Running Memory
w/o Debug w/ Debug Time Time Footprint
SPEC CINT2006 2.21 1.38 1.25 0.97 1.00
PETSc 1.50 1.09 1.32 0.95 1.00
Firefox 1.17 1.21 1.13 0.94 1.00
Average 1.63 1.23 1.23 0.95 1.00
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Since we are adding extra data to executable les, the size on disk unavoidably
increases. On average, we are adding about 20 bytes of data to the executable for
each basic block, and two extra symbols to the symbol table for each function. Table
4.1 shows the normalized le sizes across three sets of benchmarks along with the
overall average. The column `w/o Debug' shows the comparison of le sizes when
they are built without the debug ag on while the column `w/ Debug' shows the
comparison with the debug ag (-g) on. We show both numbers since we realize
executables are often built with debug ag on to improve debugging and other binary
analyses on these les. The highest increase compared to the size of the original set of
executables, 121%, was observed while compiling the SPEC CINT2006 benchmarks
without the debug ag on. The average le size increase compared to the size of
the original set of executables was 63% while compiling without the debug ag on,
and 23% while compiling with the debug ag on. We assert that this increase is
manageable since it does not impact the memory used during execution.
Another evaluation metric we used is the compilation time. Since our compi-
lation mechanism uses an intermediate step to process the assembly code generated
by gcc, our compilations take more time than the original compilations. The bulk
of the increase in compilation time comes from the cost of processing an assembly
le as text, and writing out a modied assembly le, again as text. We understand
this step is costly. To be more precise, our experiments showed a 23% increase in
the compilation time as seen in Table 4.1. We believe our system can easily be inte-
grated into a mainstream compiler such as gcc. Since compilers already keep track
of the information we generate using our own mechanism, the added cost would be
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minimal: about the same as the cost of writing those tables to the binary. This
improvement remains as future work.
4.4.2.3 Running Time Metrics
The next set of metrics we looked at was the running times of the executables
built using our compilation mechanism and their memory footprint. The results are
presented in Table 4.1. For these experiments, we used workloads provided by the
benchmarks. SPEC CINT2006 benchmarks have well-dened workloads: We used
ref data sets for each benchmark. For PETSc, we used ex30 executable in snes
package since it runs long enough for consistent timing (for about 28 minutes on 6
cores on the platform described in Section 4.4.1).
Timing Firefox runs was trickier as it does not ship with any specic workloads.
The normalized times we report in Table 4.1 is the time it takes Firefox to nish
execution when launched with --help ag on the command line. Since this type
of execution may hide some of the properties of execution, we also benchmarked
Firefox with a JavaScript benchmark, V8 [35]. However, results of this benchmark
cannot be converted to running time directly. Therefore, we report these numbers
separately in Table 4.2. Readers should note that higher numbers represent better
performance in the V8 benchmark.
In our experiments we have not experienced any measurable increase of the
execution time of the benchmarks. The slight improvement we observed in the
running time after using our compilation mechanism is well within the noise of the
experiment. Similarly, V8 benchmark results indicate that performance of Firefox
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Table 4.2: Firefox Performance with Tables using V8 JavaScript benchmark (Bigger
is better)
Firefox Version V8 Score
Built with system compiler (gnu compiler suite) 2549.2
Built with our compilation mechanism 2587.6
built with our compilation mechanism is almost identical to the performance of
Firefox built with the system compiler.
We expect no memory footprint change from our approach. To verify this, we
evaluated each executable under Valgrind's massif tool [65]. Standard execution
of this tool measures the heap memory used by the target executable. For these
experiments, we ran the tool with a ag that also takes stack memory into account
(i.e. --pages-as-heap=yes). Table 4.1 shows no change in the memory footprint.
Results indicate that both stack and heap memory used by the programs remain
about the same.
4.5 Discussion
Parsing executable les is the rst step for any CFG-based binary analysis.
Our experimental results show that our mechanism clearly speeds up parsing ex-
ecutable les. As a result, executables can be analyzed faster. It is not hard to
imagine bundling more information with the binary would be useful to speed up
other binary analyses, or improve their precision, such as liveness analysis of regis-
ters or dependency analysis.
However, there are also shortcomings of our work. One such shortcoming is
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that our system adds 2n more symbols into the symbol table where n is the number
of functions. Since symbol table formats are highly-optimized for space eciency
and look-up speed, this issue is more like a nuisance than a technical problem.
Another shortcoming is that our tool is not fully reliable for processing hand-
written assembly les when branch instructions do not identify targets with labels
but rather with osets from those branch instructions. This sort of assembly code
can only be produced by experts through hand-tuning for a specic target architec-
ture. Although this shortcoming can be alleviated with better analysis of assembly
code, we observed such cases were extremely uncommon7 to justify the eort.
Increased compilation times might also be annoying for large frameworks such
as Firefox. Although the increase in the compilation time was about 23% in our
experiments, this increase translates to approximately 20 minutes with such a long
build time. However, we expect that integrating our system with a full compiler
would substantially speed up compilation and minimize the extra time compilation
takes.
One improvement to our plain text table based system would be compressing
Basic Block and Edge Tables to reduce disk space demand. In our preliminary ex-
perimentations, we observed that compressing Basic Block and Edge Tables reduced
the size of these tables by about 78%. However, since binary analysis tools cannot
read compressed tables directly, they would need to decompress them before rst
use. This approach incurs a runtime performance penalty, and our rst aim is to
reduce the runtime costs.




Parsing binary code is the rst step for most binary analyses. However, it
is costly and imprecise especially on variable-length instruction set architectures.
Still, for situations where source code is not available, there is no chance but to
parse binaries.
In this chapter we introduced a novel compilation mechanism that improves
the parsing speed of binary les when they are examined by binary analysis tools.
Our compiler creates intermediate assembly les, augments them with information
about basic blocks and edges between them, and generates executable les using
this augmented assembly code.
We implemented an instrumentation program for basic block counting that
rewrites a binary to the disk with the instrumentation code using the Dyninst li-
brary. We showed that running this analysis code on various benchmarks resulted
in up to 4.4x speed-up in parsing time, with an average of 3.8x. Although the size
of the binary les increase with extra data in the tables we generate, since these
tables are not loaded into memory during execution, the size of the runtime memory
image of the executable remains the same as before. Moreover, there is no runtime
performance degradation due to these tables.
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Chapter 5
Prole-driven Selective Program Loading
Chapters 3 and 4 were about simplifying the instrumentation process. Chap-
ters 5 and 6, on the other hand, are about improving properties of programs using
various instrumentation and binary editing techniques.
This chapter introduces a mechanism to reduce the memory footprint of shared
libraries by avoiding loading their unused functions. We talk about how shared
libraries are modied so that loaders omit some parts while loading them. We then
talk about the reduction in the number of memory pages occupied by these shared
libraries, and show that the running time of applications do not change. We conclude
with a discussion.
5.1 Overview
Software systems have been constantly getting more functional and complex.
Most systems are not composed of a single executable le any more; they are a
combination of many executables and shared libraries. These executables often use
components developed by others. Frequently, users of these general purpose shared
libraries are interested in only a fraction of a library's functionality.
Ideally, only the necessary parts of shared libraries should reside in main mem-
ory during execution. Traditionally systems have relied on demand paging to only
load those parts of libraries that are actually used into memory. However, systems
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such as IBM's BlueGene and Cray XT series lack local disks on each compute node
and therefore avoid virtual memory and demand paging for performance reasons
[2, 43]. Thus the available memory on such systems is limited to what is physically
available. Moreover, this memory is shared between applications and their data.
Reducing the memory footprint of application text space is therefore crucial for
large and complex applications that deal with large datasets.
During launch of an application, the executable le and all of shared libraries
are loaded into memory [56]. Typical applications today use several large shared
libraries and relatively small executable les. A typical PETSc application takes over
16MB of memory to load the application and shared libraries although the actual
executable only occupies 0.02MB of that space. Many large US DOE applications
have text segment sizes of around 100 megabytes.
In this work, we propose a system that reduces the memory footprint of shared
libraries by eliminating unused parts of libraries from an executable. Our approach
relies on an ecient proling mechanism that lets us determine a list of functions
that are not executed in the common case. We then modify ELF program headers
so that these functions are not loaded into memory when the program is launched.
If, for some reason, any function that has not been loaded is accessed at runtime,
our system includes an error recovery mechanism that loads that function into the
memory and allows the application to continue execution.
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Figure 5.1: Overview of the Selective Program Loading System: Executables and
shared libraries are proled and rewritten
5.2 Architecture
Figure 5.1 shows the architecture of our system. It is composed of a proler,
and a program analyzer / rewriter.
Our design obeys the make the common case fast motto. A proler is used
to get a trace of executed functions for a given application. Then, a list of functions
that are not used is generated for each shared library. Since code has to be loaded
in page-sized units, removing a single function does not save any pages since there
is usually other code around that function that still needs to be loaded. Therefore,
we need to re-arrange code and group unused functions so that we can remove them
from the loadable sections altogether. Our tool moves all unused functions to the
end of the code section and modies ELF program headers to make those parts
unloadable. Finally, our tool writes the modied shared libraries to the disk to
make the changes permanent.
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5.3 Target Applications and Platforms
Our prime target is applications that use a limited number of functions from
many shared libraries or frameworks, such as the PETSc. Our system can easily be
applied to any shared library on any ELF platform (e.g. most Unix-based systems).
For this work, we concentrated our development eorts on one architecture, the
x86, since that was the most available cluster at the time. However, high end HPC
systems like BlueGene and Cray that do not support demand paging can benet
from our system the most since available memory is scarcer on these systems.
5.4 System Design
Our system is composed of three main components. Proling is performed
to identify a list of functions that are used during training runs of the executable.
Proling data is fed to our analyzer and a binary rewriter which uses Dyninst [11]
to access functions, their control ow graphs, basic blocks, and nally instructions.
For each shared library, our analyzer and binary rewriter performs the following
tasks:
1. Calculation of updated start addresses for each function that is being moved.
Functions that are used often will be placed before the functions that are rarely
or never used.
2. Code generation for moved functions. Call instructions, address calculations
for global oset table (GOT), contents of jump tables, and function pointer
calculations are updated using the new locations.
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3. Symbol updates so that cross library calls can be directed to the correct loca-
tion.
4. Rewrite of the updated shared library to a new le.
In the following sections implementation details and challenges of each process
are discussed.
5.4.1 Proling
In order to extract a list of functions that are usually not used by a program,
we rst observe several executions of the program and obtain a list of functions that
are used by this program. A proler is used to obtain a list of functions that are
used at a specic run of the program. We combine all training runs and note all
functions ever called.
There are various prolers that serve dierent needs. For our analysis we
used sprof [26] and our own tool based on Dyninst [11]. sprof is a GNU proling
tool for shared libraries. We used this tool to create a quick mechanism to prole
shared libraries, and used it for our initial tests. However, sprof can only prole
one shared library per execution. Since this limitation impeded our simultaneous
proling eorts, we switched to our own Dyninst-based proler. Our proler rewrites




Once the shared libraries are proled, this proling data is used to identify
functions that will always be loaded, and those that will only be loaded on demand
upon rst call. Our system modies LOAD entries in ELF headers so that the loader
selectively loads functions that are known to be used. To maximize memory savings,
functions are split into two groups: Used and Unused. Grouping functions requires
moving around their machine code in the binary. Since the correct execution of
an instruction usually relies on where it is located in binary (e.g. a relative jump
instruction), extensive analysis is performed to make sure that the external behavior
of an instruction does not change once it is moved. The shared library is then
rewritten to the disk.
Binary code in static programs is not relocatable. Therefore, grouping unused
functions in these executables would require modifying a large number of instructions
to make them relocatable. Moreover, such executables are usually developed with
one task in mind and unused functions occupy little memory. Therefore, these les
are not modied: they are still loaded as a whole at runtime. Our tool links these
driver programs with a shared library that is responsible for signal handling to load
missing pages on-demand.
5.4.2.1 Avoiding Loading Unused Functions
To reduce the memory footprint of applications, we rst need a mechanism
that will allow us avoid loading parts of shared libraries while enabling the process
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to access these regions when necessary.
One way of getting around this problem is to split each shared library into two
shared libraries: one that contains functions that will likely be called, and one that
contains the remaining functions. If a function that is not currently available is called
during runtime, a signal handling mechanism could load the shared library that
contains this function and transfer control to that function. However, this scheme
requires loading this whole shared library even though there is a single function
that is used. As a result, it is not very eective in recovering from an unexpected
call. Moreover, splitting shared libraries is complex since it requires moving most
functions and symbols while regenerating the symbol table and procedure linkage
table so that cross-library calls can be satised. It also requires adding a mechanism
to access global variables across shared libraries.
Our mechanism, on the other hand, is very simple and eective. During the
rewriting phase we modify appropriate ELF headers to accommodate selectively
loading chunks of the original program or shared library. Loaders rely on program
headers in ELF binaries and only load parts of the binary that has a matching
LOAD entry in the program headers. Our rewriting mechanism modies these
LOAD entries by changing the address ranges and adding new ones if necessary
so that it only loads desired (used) part of the library. The loader then loads the
appropriate regions in the binary, leaving out the parts that are unlikely to be used.
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5.4.2.2 Update Relative Calls
In a shared library with position independent code, most call instructions
employ relative addressing. The exact target address is calculated using the current
program counter and the oset that is stored in the call instruction. These osets
need to be updated during the function shuing process if either callee or caller is
moved. When the relative position of a call instruction changes with respect to its
target, the address computation generates an incorrect address for the target unless
the oset in the call instruction is correctly updated. As a result, our rewriting
mechanism goes over every such instruction and updates the osets to match the
current layout.
5.4.2.3 Update Symbols
There is no guarantee that a given shared library will always be loaded at a
specic address each time a process launches. As a result, addresses of functions in
shared libraries cannot be known before launch time. Moreover, if a call instruction
and its target are in dierent shared libraries, their relative position with respect to
each other cannot be known before launch time. In such cases, any call instruction,
rather than jumping directly to the callee, has to go through the procedure linkage
table. The dynamic linker looks up for the callee upon the rst call to that function.
The look up process consists of matching the mangled name of the callee with a list
of symbols that appear in the shared libraries. When a matching symbol is found,
the address it contains is written to the corresponding procedure linkage table entry.
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If a function is moved within a shared library without updating corresponding
symbols, the dynamic linker cannot correctly look up for the actual address of
this function since the symbol information still points to the old location of this
function. Our rewriting mechanism locates such symbols and updates them with
the new addresses of associated functions.
5.4.2.4 Update Jump Tables
Most current compilers make use of jump tables for n-way branches (e.g. switch
statements in C). During the compilation process, such control ow structures are
converted into an indirect jump instruction that reads addresses of targets from a
table called jump table. In a shared library that contains position independent code,
jump tables contain osets rather than absolute addresses. These osets correspond
to the dierence between the address of each target and the address of the global
oset table of that specic binary.
If the function referenced in a jump table is moved, the jump table becomes
invalid because the relative osets of the function within the library have changed.
Our rewriting mechanism updates each jump table entry for moved functions. We
use Dyninst [11] to locate the jump tables for us since they are not marked by the
compilers. An oset is computed such that it equals the displacement of the moved
function from its old location in the shared library to its new location. That oset
is added to each entry in the jump table associated with an indirect jump in this
function.
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5.4.2.5 Update Function Address Transfers
Function pointers are simply variables that contain addresses of functions. A
function pointer becomes invalid when the associated function is moved to another
address. Our tool recognizes writes to function pointers and updates them accord-
ingly if the target functions are moved.
Since addresses of functions in shared libraries cannot be known before run-
time, there has to be some runtime computation for writes to function pointers.
There are two ways these addresses are computed:
1. Computed by the loader: Each function pointer that resides in the data sec-
tion has an associated entry in the relocation table. The loader updates these
function pointers during relocation. Moving a function invalidates the asso-
ciated function pointer. Our tool checks each relocation entry and updates
the ones that point to moved functions so that they will point to the correct
location after relocation.
2. Using the global oset table address at run-time: In some cases, function ad-
dresses are computed using relative displacement of a function from the start
of the global oset table. Moving the target function to another location re-
quires updating this computation. This case requires thorough analysis since
the address computation might take place at any valid code region. Therefore,
an instruction-by-instruction analysis is performed to identify such computa-




Our system provides a mechanism to recover when a function we did not load
is called. As part of the oine analysis, the executable le is linked with a new
shared library that contains a signal handler. During the execution if the control is
transferred to some instruction that is not available in memory, the process generates
a segmentation fault signal (SIGSEGV). Our signal handler, in turn, locates that
function and maps it into memory (In reality, the whole page that contains this
function is mapped since most systems only allow mapping an entire page). Systems
with local hard drives can directly map a page to the memory. However, on HPC
systems where compute nodes lack hard drives, load operations cannot be performed
directly. On such systems, I/O nodes assist the compute nodes to load the required
page over the network. Once the function is loaded, the execution resumes with the
function that has just been loaded.
5.5 Experimental Results
To demonstrate our system, we performed our analysis on two sample PETSc
applications (ex2 from the ksp package and ex5 from the snes package) [4] and GS2
[48, 25].
PETSc (Portable, Extensible Toolkit for Scientic Computation) is a suite of
data structures and routines for the scalable (parallel) solution of scientic appli-
cations modeled by partial dierential equations. It uses MPI for parallelization.
It has linear and non-linear equation solvers and supports C, C++, Fortran and
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Python. By default, PETSc generates statically linked libraries. For this work,
we forced PETSc to create shared libraries as well. The rst PETSc program we
used, ex5 from the snes package, has 279 lines of code; whereas the second PETSc
program we used, ex2 from the ksp package, has 79 lines of code. PETSc suite is
composed of 879,772 lines of code in total.
GS2 is a physics application developed to study low-frequency turbulence in
magnetized plasma. It is typically used to assess the micro-stability of plasmas
produced in the laboratory and to calculate key properties of the turbulence which
results from instabilities. It is also used to simulate turbulence in plasmas which
occur in nature, such as in astrophysical and magnetospheric systems. GS2 is com-
posed of 53,105 lines of code and is linked with a total of 20 shared libraries.
All shared libraries we examined were compiled with the debug ag on and
without optimization. We used Open MPI [32] for an implementation of message
passing interface.
5.5.1 Environment
We tested our system on a 64 node cluster owned and operated by UMIACS
at the University of Maryland. Nodes are connected using Myrinet. Each node has
two 32-bit x86 processors and runs Red Hat (version 4.1.2).
5.5.2 Results
Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 show how much saving one can achieve on a typical
application. In our experiments the space savings of the text space ranged from
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Table 5.1: PETSc results for ex5 from snes package
Library Name
Original Modied Reduction Reduction
in Pages in KB in Pages in KB in Pages (%) in bytes (%)
petsc 260 1034 68 266 73.85 74.24
petscdm 161 640 19 72 88.2 88.79
petscksp 335 1337 39 153 88.36 88.59
petscmat 772 3085 40 157 94.82 94.92
petscvec 204 813 52 205 74.51 74.76
petscsnes 20 77 20 77 0 0
mpi_cxx 10 36 5 16 50 54.93
mpi 142 564 37 144 73.94 74.45
open-pal 62 241 34 129 45.16 46.48
open-rte 55 215 34 131 38.18 39
m 28 108 3 8 89.29 92.27
X11 146 578 7 22 95.21 96.13
lapack 866 3458 2 2 99.77 99.94
blas 80 315 3 7 96.25 97.9
stdc++ 133 529 12 45 90.98 91.54
gcc_s 12 45 2 5 83.33 88.95
Xau 2 3 2 3 0 0
Xdcm 3 7 3 7 0 0
gfortran 123 485 4 9 96.75 98.13
dl 2 4 2 4 0 0
nsl 14 55 2 7 85.71 87.59
util 2 2 2 2 0 0
TOTAL 2021 13632 348 1472 82.78 89.2
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Table 5.2: PETSc results for ex2 from ksp package
Library Name
Original Modied Reduction Reduction
in Pages in KB in Pages in KB in Pages (%) in bytes (%)
petsc 260 1034 72 282 72.31 72.73
petscdm 161 640 3 8 98.14 98.75
petscksp 335 1337 49 193 85.37 85.56
petscmat 772 3085 49 193 93.65 93.74
petscvec 204 813 54 213 73.53 73.8
mpi_cxx 10 36 5 16 50 55.56
mpi 142 564 47 184 66.9 67.38
open-pal 62 241 37 141 40.32 41.49
open-rte 55 215 36 139 34.55 35.35
TOTAL 2001 7965 352 1369 82.41 82.81
34.6% to 100% for all shared libraries over 7KB of text space. The total weighted
average of space savings is 82.0%. There are some libraries that are used fairly often
such as libopen-rte.so, which is a library in the Open MPI suite. On the other hand,
some libraries such as libMdsLib.so are not used at all although they are linked with
the application.
Figure 5.2 shows a comparison of running times between the original and
modied applications in logarithmic scale. Although, the dierence in running
times is not large enough to make any conclusive statement, results support our
assertion that our tool does not cause any performance overhead for applications
that run more than a few seconds.
In our experiments, the modied GS2 runs took 5 seconds less than the un-
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Table 5.3: GS2 results
Library Name
Original Modied Reduction Reduction
in Pages in KB in Pages in KB in Pages (%) in bytes (%)
MdsLib 21 80 0 0 100 100
MdsShr 21 80 0 0 100 100
TdiShr 220 875 3 9 98.64 98.97
TreeShr 38 150 0 0 100 100
tw 70 276 25 96 64.29 65.22
rtw 58 228 8 28 86.21 87.72
mpi_f77 13 48 2 4 84.62 91.67
mpi 142 564 40 156 71.83 72.34
open-pal 62 241 36 137 41.94 43.15
open-rte 55 215 36 139 34.55 35.35
TOTAL 700 2757 150 569 78.57 79.36
Figure 5.2: Running Times with Selective Program Loading in logarithmic scale
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modied program (36 minutes 33 seconds vs. 36 minutes 38 seconds). Functions
used by modied binaries occupy fewer pages; therefore, cache misses might be less
frequent. Also, the paging system of the operating system might be spending less
time loading and unloading pages.
On the other hand, applications that run for only few seconds might experience
some slowdown due to initial signal handler registration. ex5 from PETSc's snes
package takes 1.05 seconds on average. In our experiments modied executable
experienced about 19% slowdown since it did not run long enough to compensate
for the cost of initial signal handler registration. Conversely, ex2 from PETSc's ksp
package runs for about 2.7 seconds and the modied executable experiences more
than a 6% speedup. This result shows that this application runs long enough to
compensate for the initial cost of running modied binaries.
Since most HPC applications take several minutes to complete, our impression
is that modied binaries will likely not cause any overhead and might cause some
speedup.
Just like any other on-demand tool, the performance of our system might suer
due to mapping. However, this operation is rarely necessary. In our experiments,
the training runs accurately identied all functions that were called and thus on-
demand mapping was never performed. Yet, we wanted to present the amount of
time it takes to map one page into the memory at runtime. For this experiment, we
created an executable with 100 functions where none of them were loaded into the
memory at the start of execution. Since functions were aligned at page boundaries,
these 100 functions occupy 100 pages. The executable le was stored on a remote
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server, and it was accessed through the network using the SSH Filesystem [77].
For this experiment, SSH Filesystem's caching support was turned o. We ran
this executable 5 times, forcing on-demand loading of missing pages a total of 500
times. Our experiments showed that loading a page into the memory over the local
area network takes an average of 1.42 milliseconds. When the le is stored on a
local drive, loading a missing page takes an average of 0.54 milliseconds. Loading
a page once enables execution of all functions in that page. Moreover, with proper
proling, this operation is rarely necessary. Therefore, the cost of an occasional
page load operation is negligible when the whole execution is taken into account.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we proposed a new system that reduced memory footprint
of executables linked with many shared libraries. After an oine rewriting phase,
we managed to reduce the number of loadable pages in target shared libraries by
an average of 85.0%. We also demonstrated that our tool causes no performance
overhead for reasonably long running programs. Upon a call to a function that is
not loaded into memory by the loader, our error recovery mechanism maps the page
which contains that function into memory and continue execution without a failure,
all in about 1.4 milliseconds. These properties show that our system performs





Security through Runtime Function Relocation
So far, we discussed ways to improve binary analysis and its uses. In this
chapter, we show a dierent aspect of binary manipulation: improved security of
applications. This work introduces a binary rewriting mechanism to make functions
fully relocatable. Then, we show how these functions can be continuously relocated
at runtime to improve the overall security of vulnerable applications. We show that
programs rewritten by our mechanism are indeed more resistant against attacks. We
also provide a discussion about the runtime overhead of our system, and conclude
with a discussion of the security implications of our system.
6.1 Overview
Software security has long been a critical issue. Attackers exploit vulnerable
software to steal unauthorized nancial information, to obtain trade secrets, and,
in some cases, just to have fun. Recent attacks carried out by the Stuxnet [50] and
Flame [73] worms suggest that such attacks might also be carried out for cyberwar-
fare. In such an environment, cyber defense is a priority both for nancial industry
and national security.
In the center of successful system intrusion attempts, memory corruption vul-
nerabilities play a big role. Such vulnerabilities include buer and integer overows,
format string errors, double-free problems, etc. Attacks that target these vulnera-
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bilities rely on the knowledge of the locations of critical program elements.
It is now common knowledge that diversity in computer systems enhance over-
all security [31]. From an administrative point of view, though, diversity can be
chaotic. To avoid problems with the administration of computer systems,there has
been a tendency to provide security through launch-time randomization. The PaX
Team was the rst to introduce Address Space Layout Randomization [67]. This
randomization process involves rebasing program code and data with an oset. Once
the address space is randomized, an attacker has to try addresses from a large pool
to nd the location of a critical function. However, evaluating the eectiveness of
Address Space Layout Randomization, Shacham et al. showed that brute force at-
tacks are a big concern against services that fork many child processes [72]. In their
experiments it took them only 216 seconds on average to obtain a remote shell on
a target 32-bit machine. Evidently, just rebasing executable les may not provide
the required level of security.
In this chapter, we present a novel approach for providing security through
continuous randomization by relocating functions at runtime. Executable les are
rst rewritten to make individual functions completely relocatable. When the pro-
gram is run, functions in that program and its shared libraries are relocated at
runtime to prevent attackers from guessing the locations of these functions. This ap-
proach makes programs more resistant against attacks since attackers cannot guess
the locations of critical functions. Even child processes that were once an exact copy
of the parent process evolve over time and show dierent characteristics, reducing
the chances of brute force attacks to succeed.
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Figure 6.1: Overview of Runtime Function Relocation System
6.2 NINJA: Runtime Function Relocator
Our system, NINJA1, provides runtime function relocation to prevent mali-
cious attacks. Unlike previous systems where entire executable les are relocated
once with a xed oset for the entire duration of execution, our system continuously
relocates individual functions at runtime using a user-dened relocation strategy.
Relocating a function is not as straightforward as just copying the bytes of
that function; during relocation most of the addresses inside this function have to
be updated, such as addresses in branch and call instructions as well as the ones in
branch tables. This process requires analyzing the function and parsing its bytes to
identify instructions and operands of these instructions. If this function is relocated
again, all of these steps have to be repeated unless they are cached. Performing
these operations at runtime causes a huge runtime overhead and is not practical.
To avoid the high cost of analyzing and updating functions at runtime, we
analyze functions before execution and rewrite them to be completely relocatable, as
illustrated in Fig. 6.1: Our binary rewriter takes in an executable le and produces
a completely relocatable executable. Functions are relocated at runtime by our
relocation module (aka Relocator) with no further modication to the relocated
1NINJA: No INtrusion by Jumping Around
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function. This module rst evaluates whether the function in question should be
relocated with respect to a preselected relocation strategy; then copies the function
to a new memory location, and updates associated data structures. Usually, only
one memory location is updated during this process; the actual copy operation does
not modify the bytes of the function.
In the following sections we explain how we make functions completely relo-
catable, and then describe how they are relocated by our relocation module.
6.3 Relocatable Functions
Normally, functions are not relocatable. They contain hard coded addresses
that prohibit them from correctly executing at another location. Even functions
that are part of relocatable libraries2 are not individually relocatable because these
functions use relative addressing across function boundaries, and they break when
either the source or the target function moves to another location and thus change
the relative distance between them. Therefore, relocatable libraries are only relocat-
able as a whole.
Our runtime instrumentation tool relocates a function after analyzing it thor-
oughly and rewriting the addresses it uses. This requires creating the control ow
graph of that function, going over its instructions one-by-one and updating the ones
that depend on addresses of other constructs. Moreover, any call instruction whose
target is this relocated function has to be updated. It is worth mentioning that these
call instructions can be anywhere in the program; therefore, all functions have to be
2Relocatable libraries are built with position independent code such as gcc's -fPIC ag.
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Table 6.1: Parts of Functions Modied by NINJA during Pre-processing
Function Entry Initial function location is saved on the stack
Function Call Function calls are redirected through the Function Table.
rsp-based Addressing Osets based on the stack pointer that point to parame-
ters to this function are updated
rip-based Addressing Addresses based on the instruction-pointer are modied
to use the initial function location value instead.
Table-based Branch-
ing
Absolute addresses in branch tables are replaced with rel-
ative addresses. Current address is added to these osets
before branching takes place.
Function Exit Initial function location is removed from the stack. Re-
locator is invoked if this function needs to be relocated.
analyzed to move even a single function. These operations are costly, and certainly
unaordable at runtime. To avoid this cost, we analyze functions before execution
and rewrite them to be completely relocatable. For this purpose, our system heavily
uses Dyninst's binary editing capabilities.
At the center of our approach is the Function Table, a table of function ad-
dresses. Each executable le has its own Function Table. Call operations read the
addresses of target functions from this table. Another important mechanism to-
wards relocatable functions is the store operation of a constant value on the stack.
This value corresponds to the initial location of the function and is called initial
function location.
Table 6.1 summarizes some of the actions taken for editing functions. Our
binary rewriter updates all absolute addresses as well as all addresses based on the
instruction-pointer. Moreover, call operations are rewritten to use the Function
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Table. Since we store information about execution on the stack, some instructions
that use the stack are also updated. In the following subsections we explain the
steps taken while creating completely relocatable functions.
6.3.1 Function Calls and Function Table
A traditional call instruction contains the address of the target function. Re-
locating the target function, however, renders this call instruction invalid, as the
control ow cannot reach the start of a function if it is not where it is supposed to
be. Therefore, call instructions whose target is relocated have to be updated with
the correct address. However, as we pointed out earlier, this would be extremely
costly since such call instructions can be anywhere. To prevent this cost, each call
instruction is rewritten before the actual execution to use the Function Table.
Each entry in the Function Table contains the address of the initial location of
the function, its current location, its size, a counter of how many times it was called
since last relocation, and a counter of how many frames on the stack correspond
to this function. This last counter is required to avoid relocating a function when
there is another active frame on the stack associated with it, such as in the case
with recursive function calls. Otherwise, this relocation would cause a crash. When
a call is made, the current location of the callee is read from this table and the call
is carried out using this address. Each Function Table is stored in the data section
of the associated executable.
The location of the Function Table remains xed throughout the execution.
Return-oriented programming attacks can only redirect control ow to a specic
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address, and forcing a jump to the Function Table will only result in a crash since
the Function Table does not contain executable code. For a successful attack, an
attacker rst has to read the memory occupied by the Function Table, and then
use the addresses stored in that table to successfully attack a target function. If
an attacker can already read random memory in the address space of the attacked
process, the program must have already been compromised, and further damage can
be carried out by other means. The Function Table can be a source of vulnerability
if an attacker manages to exploit a buer overow and overwrite the entries in the
Function Table. These attacks can be prevented by storing the Function Table in
pages of its own and using unmapped guard pages on each end of the table. Any
attempt to overwrite entries in this Function Table will result in a crash when the
attacker touches the unmapped guard pages. As a result, the fact that the location
of the Function Table is xed does not decrease the overall security of the application
as long as it is not already compromised by other means.
6.3.2 Initial Function Location
When a source le is compiled into position independent code (PIC), compilers
emit code with an addressing method based on the instruction pointer3 and an oset
representing the distance between the current instruction and the target address,
instead of using absolute addresses. Usually, there are many occurrences of this
addressing method in a function. When a function is relocated, osets in each such
instruction have to be updated since the value of the instruction pointer changes
3Instruction pointer is stored in the rip register on x86-64
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due to relocation. However, we cannot aord to update every such oset during
runtime function relocation.
To speed up this process, we rewrite each function in a way that osets do
not have to be updated during relocation. Instructions that use the instruction
pointer are rewritten to use a constant value called initial function location, stored
on the stack, and an oset computed during the rewrite operation. Since the ini-
tial function location value is constant, the osets do not have to be updated. To
accommodate shared libraries, this initial function location value depends on the
actual location of the function when the program starts, calculated using the in-
struction pointer. When this function is relocated for the rst time, the dependency
on the instruction pointer is removed, and the initial function location is set to the
address of the initial location of that function before the relocation. Hence, our ad-
dressing mechanism does not use instruction pointers, and osets remain the same
throughout the execution.
6.3.3 Indirect Branches That Use Tables
Compilers often convert switch/case statements into branches that use tables
called jump or branch tables. These branch instructions read the target address from
a table using an index calculated from the operand of the switch/case statement.
These jump tables contain absolute addresses. When a function is relocated, the
addresses stored in these jump tables become invalid. During the rewrite process,
our system identies jump tables and updates the entries in these tables to use osets
rather than absolute addresses. The osets read from these tables are updated just
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before the branch operations take place using the current location of the function.
A similar operation is performed for indirect branches that deal with MOVAPS
tables4. These branches are also rewritten so that the target address is updated using
the current location of the function.
6.3.4 Accessing Parameters Stored on Stack
When there are more parameters than there are available registers for param-
eter passing, parameters are pushed to the stack before a function call takes place.
Functions that are made relocatable by our rewriter also use the stack to store the
initial function location value between the local variables and parameters passed
to this function. Although local variables can still be accessed as before, accessing
parameters stored on the stack requires us to modify the osets used to address
these stack locations. Parameters are usually accessed using either the stack pointer
or the base pointer. Our rewriter analyzes all instructions that use these registers
and updates their osets if they access these parameters.
6.4 Runtime Function Relocation
Our system performs rst-party runtime function relocation, i.e. executables
are capable of and responsible for relocating their own functions, and there is no
external monitor program. At the end of each function execution, we check how
4When a set of registers need to be saved before certain kinds of operations, a sequence of
MOVAPS instructions are used. Depending on the parameters, the execution might save between
0 and 8 registers. Exactly how many of these registers will be saved are determined by an indirect
branch.
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many times that function has executed since the last relocation. Depending on our
relocation strategy, our relocator decides whether we should relocate that function
at that given time.
Assume foo is called. The call to the relocator takes place at the end of foo's
execution just before it returns back to the caller. However, any code after the call
to our relocator will be inaccessible after foo is relocated since the old foo will be
overwritten with zeroes. Our relocator, therefore, rst relocates foo, then executes
foo's epilogue without giving control back to foo, and returns back to foo's caller,
by-passing foo's own return instruction which has since moved.
The following steps are taken during relocation:
1. A chunk of memory that is large enough to store this function is obtained from
the memory manager.
2. The bytes that make up the rest of the function are copied without any mod-
ications.
3. The entry for the function in the Function Table is updated to reect that
function's new location.
If this is the rst time this function is being relocated, the instruction that
stores the initial function location value will be replaced by an instruction that
pushes a constant value to the stack to be used as the initial function location as
described in Sect. 6.3.2.
In the end, calls to this function will be redirected to the new location of the
function with the help of the updated Function Table entry.
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6.4.1 Relocation Strategies
Runtime function relocation is a costly operation. From a security point of
view, relocating functions as often as possible is preferable; however, this frequent
relocation incurs too much overhead to be practical. Therefore, we should be careful
about when we perform function relocation. In our work we tried to nd the balance
between usability of our approach and the level of security we provide. In this
section, we describe a continuum of relocation strategies our system supports:
1. Always Relocate: In this strategy, whenever a function returns, it is relo-
cated. Our Relocator always relocates functions at the end of its execution.
This strategy introduces a heavy overhead to program execution.
2. Relocate After nth call Relocating functions after each execution is re-
dundant for most functions, and not desirable in terms of overhead. In this
strategy, functions are relocated after the nth execution of that function. The
number of relocations decrease by about n-fold, reducing the runtime overhead
dramatically, even for n as low as 10, as we determined empirically (see Table
6.3).
3. Relocate Randomly In this strategy, relocation is performed periodically on
a random function. When it is time to relocate a function, a separate thread
picks a random function and relocates it. This strategy is fundamentally
dierent from and orthogonal to the previous ones; and relocation can be
performed on functions that are not yet called.
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4. Adaptive Relocation Strategy Relocating functions too often may intro-
duce a huge overhead. In this strategy, the frequency of relocation is deter-
mined on a per-function basis: Functions that are called too often are relocated
less often per call than the functions that are called less often. To determine
how often each function needs to be relocated, we rst prole the application
and gather a list of functions and how many times each of them was called.
Functions that are called less than a threshold (we used 1,000 in our examples)
are relocated every time they nish executing. Other functions are relocated
after the nth call, where n is picked with respect to how many times that
function is called during our proling runs and is in the [1 - 10,000] range.
In our test environment all functions that execute more than 100 times and
less than 10 million times are relocated a total of 100 to 1,000 times during
the entire execution. Functions that execute less than 100 times are relocated
every time they execute whereas functions that execute more than 10 million
times are relocated every 10,000th time they execute.
6.4.2 Memory Management
When a function is relocated, it is copied into a new chunk of memory, and
the old copy is dismissed. For a successful randomization eort, functions should be
copied into random memory chunks. A naïve approach would be to allocate memory
with malloc, and deallocate memory that holds the old location of the function with
free. However, this approach tends to provide very poor randomization as malloc
often returns recently freed memory.
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We use a bucket approach to avoid the cost of allocating and deallocating
memory too frequently, and to introduce consistent randomness. Each bucket is
mapped to a random address in memory. Buckets can have one of 224 addresses.
Each bucket is 16 pages long and a function can be anywhere in a bucket, introducing
another 16 bits of entropy. As a result, the total number of addresses a function
may occupy is 240, i.e. NINJA provides 40 bits of entropy.
Our relocator initially allocates a xed number of buckets. The rst operation
during relocation is picking a random bucket. If that bucket is full, it is removed
from the available buckets list, and space for a new bucket is allocated to make sure
there are at least a xed number of available buckets. When an available bucket is
found, a random gap is introduced. The function is copied right after this gap. The
old location of the function is zeroed out. If the bucket that contains the old version
of this function becomes empty, it is returned back to the list of available buckets.
We chose to provide 40 bits of entropy to match the amount of entropy
promised by the PaX patch on Linux. It is possible to congure NINJA to pro-
vide more entropy by selecting the addresses of buckets from a wider range than
224 unique addresses. Such a conguration decreases the likelihood of a successful
attack.
6.5 Security Implications of NINJA
Up to this point, we described how functions are relocated at runtime. In
this section, we will explain how relocatable functions can prevent system intrusions
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originated by return-to-libc attacks.
In return-to-libc attacks, the attacker exploits a buer overow vulnerability
by overwriting the return address stored on the stack. If the attacker knows the
location of critical functions on the remote system, he/she can make the program
return to one of these critical functions. This function in turn interprets values on
the stack as parameters. For example, if the attacker makes the program return
to the system() function5 with correct parameters, he/she will be able to execute
anything on the remote system accessible to the target process. It is not always
simple to guess the location of a critical function; however, if an attacker has access
to an exact copy of the program that is under attack (as in the case of open source
applications and widely available commercial products), he/she can examine the
program layout and determine the possible locations that a critical function might
occupy. This process drastically simplies the attack.
To make guessing the locations of critical functions harder, researchers in-
troduced randomization techniques. These techniques shue locations of program
components so that the critical functions might occupy dierent addresses across
executions. What is shued and at what frequency depends on the technique used.
The most common randomization technique is Address Space Layout Randomiza-
tion (ASLR) [67]. Traditionally, ASLR loads shared libraries at random osets at
launch-time; therefore, functions inside these shared libraries are shifted to xed,
random addresses for the duration of the execution. The same technique can be ap-
plied to static executable programs through PIE (Position Independent Executable)
5system() function gathers the commands provided by the user through parameters and executes
them on a shell.
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Figure 6.2: Non-patched Linux Kernels Provide Only 12-16 bits of Entropy
mechanism. To date, executables are not created to be PIE by default: programs
need to be compiled with specic compile ags to create PIE executables.
ASLR provides a maximum of 40 bits of entropy with patched Linux kernels.
However, most Linux kernels lack this feature and thus ASLR can only provide 28
bits of entropy6. Since an application is only randomized once at launch time, a
brute force attack is expected to take up to 228 tries. Although ASLR rebases
executables separately, a few of the most signicant bytes of addresses remain the
same for each executable as shown in Fig. 6.2: Without the enhanced ASLR kernel
patch, the 24 high-order bits of all executables are 0x00007f. In our experiments,
we realized the next 12 to 16 bits also tend to be the same. Therefore, 24 to 28
bits remain for randomization. Of these remaining bits, 12 of the low-order bits
are not randomized as ASLR can only randomize executables at page boundaries.
That leaves us with 12 to 16 bits of randomization. Figure 6.3 illustrates how an
attacker can access a critical function by just guessing a few bytes and reusing the
6Some distributions such as Alpine Linux and Hardened Gentoo supports a patched version of
the Linux kernel out of the box.
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Figure 6.3: Reduced entropy on little-endian architectures: a) Original return ad-
dress. b) Target is close to original return address. c) Target is far from the original
return address yet a number of the most-signicant bits are the same.
most signicant bytes on a little-endian architecture, e.g. the x86. Figure 6.3 a)
shows the original return address. If the target function is close to the original
return address, as is the case in Figure 6.3 b), then only guessing bits 13 through
16 correctly is enough to get to the target function (The least signicant 12 bits
can be obtained by analyzing the disk image of a copy of the executable). If target
function is further away, the number of dierent bits that have to be overwritten
increases. However, in most cases, the most signicant bits remain the same, as
demonstrated in Figure 6.3 c). Being able to guess the address of a target function
by just overwriting few of the least signicant bits drastically reduces the search
space.
Apart from the above weakness due to limited entropy, ASLR is also extremely
vulnerable when a process keeps launching child processes during execution as the
Apache HTTP Server does. Since each forked child retains the same memory layout
as the parent process, the attacker practically has an innite number of processes
with the same memory layout to attack. Eventually, the address of a critical function
will be exposed.
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Our system, on the other hand, relocates functions both post-link-time and
at runtime. Our system rst shues functions, then rewrites them to be fully
relocatable. Every rewritten executable has a dierent layout. Even if an attacker
has a copy of the original executable, he/she cannot easily guess where each function
is located after the rewrite. After the program is launched, functions are relocated
randomly, giving the executables a dierent layout every time a function is relocated.
This relocation may take place as often as after every function execution. Even if
the attacker has access to an exact copy of the target executable after the rewrite,
he/she will not be able to identify function start addresses at runtime, as they change
continuously. If the attacker somehow manages to nd the location of a function,
that function will be relocated soon, and the attacker may not be able to attack
that function in time. Since functions are randomly relocated, a parent process and
all of its child processes will all evolve into having separate memory layouts during
execution, making it much safer to fork new processes during execution.
6.6 Security Evaluation
To show the eectiveness of our system from the security point of view, we
experimented with a modied version of the Apache HTTP Server[30]. It is devel-
oped and maintained by The Apache Software Foundation and is written in C. It
is composed of more than 400,000 lines of code. The modication we applied to
this process is the introduction of a simple bug that can be exploited via an HTTP
request. Using this bug, we tried to perform a return-oriented attack to execute
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a function that was not supposed to execute at that point during execution. We
launched our attack from a client that issues HTTP requests. In our experiments,
we assumed the attacker had an exact copy of the executables that we experimented
with.
The result of our experiments is given in Table 6.2. In our rst set of exper-
iments, we attacked httpd executables that are only protected by the ASLR. For
the non-PIE httpd executable without runtime function relocation, we consistently
succeeded in executing a particular target function, foo, that resides in the httpd
executable (i.e. not in a shared library) in our rst attempt during all of our 5
experiments by exploiting the bug we introduced. Since the address of the target
function can be obtained by looking at the symbols in the httpd executable, our
attack did not involve any guessing. Then, we attacked the PIE version of the httpd
executable. Attacking the same target function, foo, succeeded almost instanta-
neously using the technique described with Fig. 6.3, as we only had to perform 16
attacks. Attacking another function, bar, that resides outside the httpd executable,
namely in libapr-1.so, took more time as we had to try more addresses. Since ASLR
cannot really provide too much entropy even for shared libraries, we were able to
have bar executed in 4.9 hours on average. We believe this time frame is short
enough for successful attacks on systems that are not constantly monitored.
Then we tried attacking the httpd and libapr-1.so executables fortied by
NINJA. In this case, we also tried to benet from the little-endianness of the archi-
tecture. However, since functions are randomly spread in the memory, we observed
exploiting little-endianness of the architecture did not provide any solid benets.
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Table 6.2: Time Required for a Successful Attack with/without Runtime Function
Relocation
Non-PIE PIE - same exec PIE - library
ASLR Instant (single try) Instant (multiple tries) 4.9 Hours
NINJA > 24 Hours > 24 Hours > 24 Hours
Figure 6.4: Probability of a Successful Attack with ASLR and NINJA (logarithmic
scale)
With this approach, whether the target function is in the same executable or not, or
whether the executable le is PIE or not did not matter as functions were relocated
by NINJA continuously in all three cases. For each run of our attack, we stopped
our experiments when the elapsed time reached 24 hours.
We show expected and measured probabilities of successful attacks with ASLR
and NINJA in Fig. 6.4. The rightmost curve shows the probability of a successful
attack on a system fortied with NINJA. As continuous function relocation pre-
vents any gain brute-force attacks may provide, this curve basically matches the
probability of a successful attack in a search space of 240 dierent addresses with
replacement. The model we used to calculate the probability of a successful attack
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on NINJA is given in Sect. 6.7. The second curve from right, ASLR, shows the
probability of a successful attack with ASLR that provides 28 bits of entropy, the
default setting for ASLR on unpatched kernels. However, in practice, ASLR can be
beaten with far less tries on little-endian architectures as described in Sect. 6.5. The
third curve from right, Far Target, shows the probability of a successful attack on
little-endian architectures as obtained by our attack simulation7 on system ASLR
when the target function is far from the original return address. Finally, the leftmost
curve shows the probability of a successful attack when the target function and the
original return address are close to each other, e.g. they are in the same executable
le. This type of attack takes a maximum of 16 tries, e.g. an attacker only needs
to guess 4 bits.
6.7 Model of NINJA Security
In this section we provide a model that shows the enhancement of security
when two of the relocation strategies described in Sect. 6.4.1, Relocate After nth
call and Relocate Randomly, are applied together.
Assume it takes a function on average E seconds to execute as the leaf function
on the stack,and assume the relocation threshold, n, is set to N . On average, it takes
EN seconds for a relocation to occur with this strategy. Therefore: 1/EN relocations
occur in one second. Moreover, a random function is relocated every R seconds. As
7Our simulation calculated the number of tries to successfully attack the Apache HTTP Server
on a real unpatched Linux system. For each iteration of our simulation, we launched the Apache
HTTP Server, obtained the addresses of target functions and original return addresses, and fed
these addresses to our simulator to calculate the number of tries required to guess the target address
on the system. Note that an actual brute-force attack would take exactly the same number of tries.
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a result, 1/R relocations take place due to our random relocation strategy. The total










If a single attack takes T seconds, and if there are F functions in the executable,
the probability of the relocation of a specic function between two attacks is:
Preloc =
T (R + EN)
FREN
(6.2)
A successful attack takes place when i) the target function is at the location
that will be attacked next, and if it does not get relocated, ii) the target function
is relocated to the address that will be attacked next. The total probability of a
success at a given try is:














Here, the rst term shows the probability of the function being at the address
that will be attacked next (1/A) and the probability of that function not being
relocated (1 − Preloc). The second term, on the other hand, shows the probability
of that function being relocated (Preloc), the probability of the function being at
another address ((A−1)/A), and the probability of that function being relocated to
that address (1/A).
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The likelihood of a successful attack during a series of attacks is:




This is the geometric series. The probability of a successful attack in the rst




(1− Patck)i = Patck
1− (1− Patck)n
1− (1− Patck)
= 1− (1− Patck)n (6.5)
The dominant term in Patck turns out to be
1/A, the probability of a successful
random attack. This observation shows that the probability of a brute force at-
tack is almost identical to the probability of a random attack, even slightly lower.
Therefore, a brute force attack will not increase the chances of a successful attack.
In our experiments, we observed that sweeping the whole 28-bit search space
ASLR provides takes about 200 days (about 16 addresses per second). Although an
uninterrupted attack that lasts 200 days is somewhat unlikely, the fact that there is
a .5% chance that ASLR can be defeated within a day shows that ASLR alone is not
very reliable. Moreover, in our experiments, we showed that we can have a critical
function executed in less than 24 hours in all of our attempts without exhausting
the full address space. NINJA decreases the likelihood of a successful attack in a
single day to 1.22e-4%, i.e. to about 1% of a 1% of a 1%. The comparison is
illustrated in Fig. 6.5. With NINJA, the probability of a successful attack is much
less than that of ASLR.
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Figure 6.5: Likelihood of a Successful Attack in 24 Hours
Information leakage is a big concern for ASLR: When the location of a function
or a known oset from a function is leaked, the security ASLR provides is compro-
mised. NINJA, on the other hand, relocates functions continuously: Even when the
location of a critical function is revealed, that function will soon be relocated by
NINJA, and attacks that follow will fail. The time it takes for a specic function
to relocate is 750 seconds when N = 100 and R = 1. When relocation is performed
more frequently, as when N = 1 and R = .1, it takes a given function about 14
seconds to relocate. Figure 6.6 shows the average duration a function occupies the
same address with various N and R values. Note that the smaller the duration, the
sooner that function will be relocated by NINJA.
To demonstrate increased security oered by NINJA against brute force at-
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Figure 6.6: Duration a Function Occupies the Same Address, in Seconds
tacks, Fig. 6.7 shows the variation in the probability of a successful attack with
respect to the number of tries on a given set of relocation parameters. Although
NINJA normally provides 40 bits of entropy, we pretend we can only use 16 bits of
entropy for this graph to be able to show the variation more clearly. This graph
veries our expectation that relocating functions more often provides a higher level
of security.
6.8 Performance Evaluation
To evaluate the overhead of runtime function relocation, we applied our tech-
nique on benchmarks in SPEC CINT2006 [38, 61]. SPEC CINT2006 contains a
series of CPU-intensive executables that are selected to evaluate the processor(s)
and the memory system. All together, SPEC CINT2006 has about 1,047,000 lines
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Figure 6.7: Probability of a Successful Attack with Varying Relocation Parameters
of code. We selected benchmarks written in C to evaluate the overhead of our sys-
tem. We ran each set of benchmarks on a 64-bit Linux machine with 2 Intel Xeon
processors with 6-cores each, clocked at 2.53 GHz, with a total main memory of
48GB.
Table 6.3 shows normalized running times of SPEC CINT 2006 benchmarks
with runtime function relocation at varying frequencies. The leftmost column, none,
shows the overhead of executing rewritten binaries without any runtime relocation,
demonstrating the runtime overhead introduced by our edits described in Sect. 6.3.
The columns that follow show the overhead of applying function relocation at run-
time: 10,000 means that functions are relocated every 10,000th time they are exe-
cuted.
Relocating functions often is clearly very costly. To improve the performance
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Table 6.3: Runtime Overhead of Runtime Function Relocation on SPEC CINT 2006
Benchmark None 10,000 1,000 100 10 1 Adaptive
perlbench 1.50 1.61 2.52 3.15 15.17 119.39 1.62
bzip2 1.01 1.03 1.16 1.18 2.49 13.44 1.02
mcf 1.07 1.18 1.44 1.05 3.64 25.45 1.21
gobmk 1.10 1.15 1.42 2.09 8.99 70.05 1.15
hmmer 1.00 1.00 1.06 1.01 1.08 1.69 1.00
sjeng 1.28 1.33 1.73 2.17 7.52 59.38 1.32
libquantum 0.98 1.01 1.06 1.03 1.24 3.37 1.21
h264ref 1.61 1.64 2.19 2.11 6.26 46.47 1.65
AVERAGE 1.19 1.22 1.51 1.61 4.79 33.75 1.25
of runtime function relocation, we proled these benchmarks and created a custom
relocation period for each function using a simple formula. In our approach, any
function that executes less than 1,000 times is relocated every time it is called. Most
of the remaining functions are relocated 100 to 1,000 times during the execution of
the benchmark. Some functions which are called very frequently are relocated every
10,000th time, and they are relocated more than 1,000 times during the execution
of the benchmark. We call this technique Adaptive Relocation. Table 6.3 also shows
the overhead associated with this Adaptive Relocation strategy. This strategy proves
to be the most useful since it oers frequent relocation with a low overhead.
Figure 6.8 illustrates the eects of applying execution-based and time-based
relocation techniques on the performance of benchmarks from the SPEC suite. We
observe the least overhead when N = Infinite and R = Infinite, i.e. when no re-
location is performed. Using smaller N values increases the frequency of relocations
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Figure 6.8: Relocation Overhead with Varying Relocation Frequencies
at the expense of increased runtime overhead. Using lower R values also tends to
increase the runtime overhead due to the increased relocation frequency. However,
performance eects in this case is not observed to be as dramatic.
6.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced a new security mechanism that reduces the
likelihood of successful attacks through continuous function relocation at runtime.
Our system rst rewrites executable les to be completely relocatable, linking them
with a relocator library. When we determine a function needs to be relocated,
we just copy the function to randomly selected vacant memory and update the
corresponding entry in the Function Table accordingly.
Our system does not require a change in the software distribution. O-the-
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shelf executables can be secured by system administrators after they are installed.
Runtime relocation is performed with no additional user interference.
We showed that our system dramatically reduces the likelihood of a successful
attack. Since locations of functions continuously change, malicious users can only try
random attacks. Unlike traditional randomization techniques, even child processes
that were once an exact copy of the parent process evolve over time by relocating
functions to dierent locations in the memory. Attackers do not get any advantage
over the single process case. Our system greatly increases the diculty of attack in
that respect compared to traditional randomization techniques where child processes
have identical layouts as the parent processes, and attackers get an arbitrarily large
number of processes with the same layout to attack.
Our system inevitably introduces some runtime overhead. In our experiments
we showed the overhead was observed at 25% on average, but varies with the user
controllable frequency of relocations. Our technique is able to change the ASLR
defeat success chances for a vulnerable HTTP server from 0.5% in 24 hours of
attack to 1.22e-4% chance of success in the same 24 hour interval. NINJA can be





Over the course of our work, we identied some extensions to our current
research. These extensions are described in our short-term road map. Moreover, we
determined new directions our research can take, as described in our long-term road
map.
7.1 Short-term Road Map
Our short-term road map describes direct extensions to our current research.
Each of these projects are expected to take 4 to 6 months to complete.
7.1.1 Compile-time Support for Function Relocation
We demonstrated the benets of using a mechanism to rewrite binaries with
fully-relocatable functions. However, analyzing and rewriting binaries is not the best
way to generate fully-relocatable code. We believe this work should be delegated
to the compiler, and binary rewriting for this purpose should only be used when
recompilation is not possible. Besides, a compiler may be able to allocate registers
more eciently whereas a rewriter can only use a register after saving the original
value and restoring that value back at the end of the generated code, unless the
register in question is dead.
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7.1.2 Compile-time Support for Reducing Memory Overhead
Compiler support might also be benecial in reducing the memory overhead
of applications when there are many unused functions inside these applications.
Given an execution prole, many compilers know how to optimize the generated
executable when the code is recompiled. Using these proles, compilers can better
place functions to increase the instruction cache performance. Compilers can also be
modied to place functions in groups so that functions that are unlikely to be used
can be put on the same page(s). These pages can then be left out at the loading
phase, reducing the memory footprint of the target applications. This approach
eliminates the extra pass performed by our rewriting operation.
7.1.3 Secure Portable Devices
Portable devices have become quite common with the introduction of smart
phones. Consumers store information about their email and bank accounts on these
devices. Moreover, they are also increasingly being used for business activities,
replacing Point-of-Sale equipment. The main drawback of these devices is that
they have limited computational power. Continuous function relocation or similar
strategies may not be practical for such devices as these operations would drain the
battery rather quickly. Our approach for securing such machines is to apply function
relocation only to critical functions. Since our current approach supports function
level granularity, our system can be extended to portable devices.
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7.1.4 Analyzing Eects of Function Relocation to ICache and TLB
As an extension to our work, we would like to investigate the eects of run-
time function relocation to instruction cache and TLB performance. In our system,
functions are relocated as a whole without changing the control ow. Therefore,
we expect the eects of runtime function relocation to the instruction cache to be
negligible. On the other hand, functions are spread across many pages. Whenever
a function is accessed in a page that is not in the TLB, a TLB miss occurs. The
larger the number of pages used by the program, the higher the probability of a
TLB miss. An analysis of TLB performance might be important for later uses of
runtime function relocation.
7.1.5 Post-link-time Function Inlining
Function inlining is performed by compilers during code generation to avoid
costly function calls when the advantage of having a separate implementation of that
function is very limited. An inlined function is executed without a function call, and
optimizations on registers can be carried out from the encapsulating function to the
inlined function. However, functions cannot be inlined when their implementation
is not available during compilation. Such cases frequently happen when the im-
plementation of a function is compiled into a dierent object le than the le into
which caller of that function is compiled. All of the functions except for the ones
that are in a shared library are linked together into one executable. At this point,
the implementation of a called function can be inserted into the caller function by
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a post-link-time binary rewriter. We can use our expertise in binary analysis and
rewriting to provide a tool that supports post-link-time function inlining.
7.2 Long-term Road Map
In this section, we present research ideas to which our experience with runtime
code generation and program modication can be applicable. These areas include
virtual machine migration, execution migration, and runtime code generation for
auto-tuning. We expect each of these ideas to take 12 to 18 months.
7.2.1 Live Virtual Machine Migration
In this dissertation, we presented techniques to relocate functions at post-link-
time and at runtime. A natural extension of our work is to apply runtime migration
techniques to processes. However, moving a process from one execution environment
to another might be problematic if the underlying systems dier.
One abstraction to remove complications of system specic execution environ-
ments is virtual machines. Virtual machines hide the details of underlying systems
and provide an identical execution environment to processes even when they run
on dierent architectures. They also provide sandboxing so that a process can only
aect the state of the virtual machine that it runs in. Moving the virtual machine to
another physical machine preserves the integrity of processes running on that virtual
machine. As part of our future work, we plan to tackle the challenges of relocating
a live virtual machine to a dierent execution environment while still supporting
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interactive applications that run on it.
7.2.2 Decoupling Execution from Physical Mediums
Tomorrow's computation devices will be tiny and gigantic. We already use
pocket-size portable computers in the form of smart phones and connect to cloud
services for most non-trivial tasks. We expect this trend to continue, dramatically
increasing the dierences in size and computation power between the systems that
provide services and the end-user devices that display the results.
Currently, portable devices only carry out light-weight tasks, mostly to save
bandwidth and to avoid paying the round-trip cost of accessing a remote server. Us-
ing an adaptive execution strategy benets users in terms of both response time and
availability. If wireless connectivity is not possible, more tasks should be performed
on the portable device. If wireless connectivity is possible, tasks can be migrated to
remote servers, and should be done so more liberally when the load on the portable
device is high. For seamless execution, this migration has to be quick and ecient.
The virtual machine migration we discussed in the previous section may also
benet portable devices. Smart phones run applications in sandboxes that can be
copied to another execution environment at runtime, provided that the new execu-
tion environment can emulate the previous execution environment. Any application
that runs on such a sandbox can then continue execution at this new environment.
This approach can be useful to move execution from a portable device to a server,
or from one portable device to another one (e.g. to a device with a bigger screen).
Another way to achieve this migration is to develop common software devel-
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opment frameworks for both consumer electronics and large scale systems. Users
can pick how much work should be done on their devices before migrating tasks
to back-end servers by choosing threshold values, either manually or through an
adaptive process. If execution should be migrated, current state of execution will
be transferred to remote system and execution will resume there. Results will be
returned and displayed on user's device once the operation is complete.
7.2.3 Use of Hardware Performance Counters for Runtime Code Mod-
ication
Processors are equipped with a set of registers called hardware performance
counters that can be programmed to count specic events that take place during
execution. Some of the supported operations include counting the number of in-
structions that have executed, the number of cache misses at various levels of the
cache hierarchy, or the number of branches. The values stored in these registers
can be read at runtime; therefore, application developers get a chance to tune their
programs at runtime.
Tuning of applications has been studied extensively in recent years. Re-
searchers have come up with mechanisms to support auto-tuning of programs at
runtime. The state of the art in auto-tuning is to measure the performance of a
given set of parameters and search the parameter space to nd optimal congura-
tion. Hardware performance counters, however, can provide feedback to search the
parameter space in the correct direction. For example, if the application experiences
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a high number of L1 cache misses, our search algorithm could try to limit the loop-
unrolling factor. With this approach, hardware performance counters may provide





In this dissertation, we introduced new techniques for improving exibility,
parsing speed, memory footprint, and security of executable les. We evaluated our
techniques on real life applications and full-size benchmarks and showed that our
techniques can be adapted without considerable drawbacks.
First, we presented Relocatable Basic Blocks that can be moved around indi-
vidually without modications to the rest of the system. Applications that benet
from Relocatable Basic Blocks include Basic-block Linkage Tables, and in some cases
Target Address Tables. Moving these basic blocks only requires copying the code to
new memory and updating corresponding entries in these tables. Relocatable Ba-
sic Blocks can be used for a simplied runtime instrumentation approach. However,
overhead of using these basic blocks can sometimes hinder the benets of using them
for increased exibility.
We then introduced a new compilation mechanism for improved binary pars-
ing speed. Our compilation mechanism intercepts calls to the system compiler using
a wrapper, and creates executable les with pre-computed Control Flow Graphs
(CFGs) stored inside the binary. These CFGs are computed at the assembly in-
struction level and are accurate when the executable le is generated. They are
stored in a section that is not loaded into the memory at runtime; therefore, the
running time and memory footprint of applications compiled with this compilation
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infrastructure are not aected.
Any binary analysis tool can benet from using these tables to build CFGs. To
demonstrate their eectiveness, we modied Dyninst [11] binary analysis tool to read
in the information about CFGs. This approach drastically sped up the process of
building CFGs: we observed an average speed-up of 3.8x with a maximum speed-up
of 4.4x.
Another mechanism we introduced targets reducing the memory footprint of
code segments of shared libraries. This mechanism involves proling shared libraries
for common use cases, then identifying functions that are not used in these common
cases, and grouping them together. Afterwards, our binary rewriting mechanism
modies the program headers in these shared libraries to make the loader skip these
unused functions during the loading of these shared libraries into the memory. If a
function that was deemed unused is called during execution, our on-demand function
loader nds that function on the disk, and loads the page that contains that function
into memory.
Our mechanism that avoids loading unused functions of shared libraries is able
to reduce the number of pages occupied by the code segments of shared libraries
by 85.0% on average. Sometimes the code section of entire libraries need not be
loaded into memory (i.e. 100% reduction in number of pages that contain the
library). In our work, we also showed that our tool does not introduce any signicant
performance overhead for programs that run for at least a few seconds.
Finally, we show that applications enjoy greater security when their functions
are relocated at runtime. In this work, we rst rewrite executable les to make
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their functions completely relocatable, then link them with a relocation library that
is responsible for moving functions at runtime. Relocation takes place either on
random functions at timed intervals or at the end of the execution of a function
when that function has executed more than a specic number of times. We present
a mathematical model that shows the likelihood of a successful attack is reduced
when our technique is applied to executables. Moreover, our experimental results
show that executables enhanced by our tool are more secure than regular executable
les: Remotely forcing execution of a target function in a regular executable le
takes 4.9 hours on average whereas we were not able to have that same function
executed in a fortied executable in 4 days during any of our experiments. Although
this approach introduces some runtime overhead - 25% on average with the default
settings - factors that cause this overhead are adjustable, and the overhead can be
reduced to about 19%.
In conclusion, this thesis shows that binary rewriting improves memory per-
formance of applications and increases overall security of critical functions while
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